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Shades of Multilateralism 
U.S. Perspectives on Europe’s Role in the War 
on Terrorism 
I. Introduction 
Europe has long had a pivotal role in American foreign policy. The 
catastrophic terrorism that came to America on that sunny Tuesday 
morning in September 2001 is unlikely to change this. Transatlantic 
relations will remain at the core of world order, even as the American giant 
concentrates its might on the prevention of another September 11
th. 
Pursuing the perpetrators of that dark deed, and more importantly, 
thwarting those who would do so again, will top the American political 
agenda for a long time to come. An unusual mood of determination has 
settled across the land; nine months on, the flags still fly; the public still 
gives the President unprecedented support in his “war on terror.” This is an 
American public that sees the biggest challenges in the war as yet to come.
1  
 
1  “Americans have no illusions about the difficulty of the battle ahead. Nine in ten 
say the country has yet to face the most difficult part of the overarching war on 
terrorism. But that concern has not dampened support for a broader military 
campaign, including one against the Iraqi president.” Claudia Deane and Dana 
Milbank, “Public Backs Expanded War but Wants More Attention at Home,” 
Washington Post, December 21, 2001, p. A28. Andrew B. Denison 
It is a people ostensibly ready to do battle with Iraq.
2 It is an America that 
sees the challenge of terrorism as long-term and complex.
3 Domestic and 
foreign policies alike have been infused with a new urgency: concentrating 
the capacities of the shaken nation on warding off the next attack. If others, 
if Europe, can help in this quest, so much the better. 
America’s new determination does not mean America is uninterested in 
partners. It does mean America is more serious about foreign policy than it 
has been in a long time. Americans will want to cooperate with partners in 
Europe and elsewhere — where possible — but Americans will also 
condone acting alone when necessary. Americans, especially within the 
broad and diverse foreign policy community, have long debated how much 
“multilateralism” is possible, how much “unilateralism” is necessary. 
Operationalized, the abstract opposites “multi” or “uni” most frequently 
refer to cooperation between the United States of America and the less than 
united states of Europe. The United States is a global power; all the same, 
when it talks about international cooperation, it is almost always also 
talking about cooperation with Europe. 
This debate over the value of the transatlantic partnership will go on, in a 
changed context certainly, but by no means bereft of the many underlying 
continuities that have come to constitute relations across the Atlantic. U.S. 
perspectives on Europe’s role in the unfolding war against terrorism must 
thus be seen in the shadow of this larger, older discourse. 
 
2  According to a January, 2002, poll by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “A solid majority (73%) favors 
taking military action against Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule there, and as many 
as 56% support using force even if it means the United States might suffer 
thousands of casualties.” “Americans Favor Force in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and…” 
www.cfr.org, www.people-press.org 
3  See Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, “Poll: Strong Backing for Bush, War, Few 
Americans See Easy End to Conflict,” Washington Post, March 11, 2002; Page 
A01. 
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1. Terms and Topic 
Speaking of “U.S. perspectives” on any subject inevitably involves a 
filtering of the roiling discussion that is American politics. A spectrum of 
contending and coalescing views within the Administration, on Capitol 
Hill, and across the country — whether in the media, business, the non-
profit sector or academe — leave policy often difficult to pin down, subject 
to much ambiguity and not a little inconsistency. 
Interestingly enough, “Europe” has moved this way as well, at least as 
manifested in Brussels, within the context of an evolving (enlarging) EU 
presence on the world stage. Checks and balances abound when trying to 
get 15 (and soon 25 + states) to agree on how to play an active world role. 
All the same, the states of the European Union are players with a specific 
presence and a specific profile around the world. The Europeans will never 
duplicate the United States across the board, nor should they. They will, 
however, have the capacity to make their uniquely European contribution 
to global peace and progress. Europe may not be number one on this planet, 
but is certainly number two in terms of global influence. Moreover, number 
three, whether China, India or Russia, is a long way behind. Europe counts, 
but how much it counts is at least as much up to the Europeans as the 
Americans. As they say, Europe’s problem is not an overly strong America, 
but an overly weak Europe. 
Speaking of a European “role” means assuming that Europe’s states are 
part of some larger community where role is seen in the context of common 
objectives. Role, one reads, is a “position, or status, within a social 
structure that is shaped by relatively precise behavioral expectations 
(norms).”
4 The transatlantic “structure,” is, at any rate, a very important 
component of Europe’s role and Europe’s world. Norms, as constructivists 
persuasively argue, do play some large though indefinite part of this 
evolving transatlantic structure. 
Europe thus has a role in the transatlantic community, but also, more 
specifically, in what has been declared by President Bush as the “war” on 
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terrorism “that will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated.”
5 It is war because of the disaster 
imposed upon America; because of the urgency of not letting it happen 
again; because of the sacrifices that may be necessary — whether in terms 
of blood, treasure, or the right to privacy. As such, and in contrast to 
Europe, Americans have largely accepted the use of the term „war.” 
Writing five months after September 11
th, Washington Post columnist 
David Ignatius argued: “Americans feel that they are at war. They feel 
vulnerable. They want to destroy the enemy before the enemy destroys 
them. Europeans may find that kind of thinking naive and simplistic, but 
they can't wish it away.”
6 Though attacked at Pearl Harbor and vulnerable 
to Soviet ICBMs, American territory had come away from the 20
th 
century’s horrific wars unscathed. The American continent seemed to offer 
a certain insular protection. 
It was this notion of American insulation, so deeply rooted in the nation’s 
psyche, that was so utterly shattered on September 11 and the weeks 
thereafter. It is uncertain whether Europeans, so accustomed to their mutual 
dependencies, really understand how much America was changed by 
September 11. It is in part this profound challenge to American national 
consciousness, and the differing historical experiences that underlie it, that 
account for why Americans have felt as comfortable using the term “war” 
to describe the anti-terror campaign as Europeans have felt uncomfortable.
7 
War it may be, but war in an American context — where presidents have 
also been known to declare “war” on things like poverty, crime and drugs. 
Not that criticism of the term “war” is entirely absent from the American 
debate. It is, however, more a reflection of concern about the implied 
 
4 Online Dictionary of the Social Sciences, http://datadump.icaap.org/cgi-
bin/glossary/SocialDict/SocialDict/SocialDict?alpha=R 
5  President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People, Sept. 20, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov  
6  David Ignatius, “The Transatlantic Rift Is Getting Serious,” Washington Post, 
February 15, 2002, p. 33. 
7  Daniel S. Hamilton, German-American Relations and the Campaign Against 
Terrorism, (Washington: The American Institute for Contemporary German 
Studies, 2002), http://www.aicgs.org 
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strategy than the term as such. There is little disagreement about urgency; 
Americans takes this problem seriously. Debate in the U.S. revolves more 
around the question of whether America can sustain such a war 
indefinitely. Observers have warned that while war connotes a great sense 
of urgency, it also implies a struggle of finite duration. Wars end, often 
with great drama and destruction, often also with a peace agreement and a 
process of reconciliation. War on terrorism, if that is what it is to be, will 
not end — at least not if such a war means a constant and continuous effort 
to ensure that the multiplying means of mass destruction are not used 
against Americans — or anyone else for that matter. The semantic quibble 
about “war” is perhaps less important than the underlying reality that the 
different sides of the Atlantic have a different sense of urgency when it 
comes to terrorism. 
Terrorism itself is a term in search of a definition. The legitimacy of 
violence is always subject to debate; the legitimacy of terrorism, it seems, 
is not. In one sense, this does involve a question of who is using violence, 
and to what end. Washington treats the Palestinian Authority differently 
than the Taliban. Yet both were governments of a sort; their acts might thus 
be defined as war crimes. The label „terrorism” tends to fall on non-state 
actors, which in turn raises the question of balance between law-
enforcement and military. Importantly, this definitional issue is not just a 
question of whom, and to what end; it is also about what kind of violence, 
and at what level. 
Perhaps it is better to approach the problem of definition by recognizing 
this: the novelty of today’s terrorism is not so much in the motives for 
violence — which have always been trouble — as in the means of violence. 
The onward march of technology will bring ever-cheaper, ever-more 
available, ever-more varied means of mass destruction. In the past, cities 
and nations were only vulnerable to the many, now they are also vulnerable 
to the few. Once it was the massed hordes, the commandeered state, that 
wielded the sword of Damocles, now it can be the terrorist cells that 
permeate our networked world. 
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Terrorism, including the use of terror for political purposes, implies a 
philosophy and strategy of violence. Terrorism can see mass destruction 
and mass murder as a statement — or as a potent form of leverage against 
the powers that be, particularly when it can also provoke mass hysteria. 
Terrorism, Clausewitz would surely say, is also about imposing one’s will 
on the opponent — whether to extract concessions or effect eradication. 
Terrorism and the means of mass destruction are inextricably linked — 
whether talking about states or non-states, about the “axis of evil” or the Al 
Qaeda. This is the plague of our age: the technologies of mass destruction 
and those that would seek to use them. 
Terrorism rendered in this manner leaves Europe, like America, moving 
into a dangerous new era of complexity and unpredictability, of 
connectivity and vulnerability. It is a brave new world where counter-
terrorism will be a central part of any foreign policy — and where the 
network nature of terrorism will leave no choice but to cooperate. The 
Toffler adage, “the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth,”
8 
implies the anti-terror war will very much be a globalizing endeavor. „The 
formation of a global coalition against terrorism means that we are now 
moving beyond the globalization of the economy to the globalization of 
politics,” writes Wolfgang Ischinger, Germany’s Ambassador to the United 
States.
9 On this front, too, the civilized world must seek to exploit the 
efficiencies of comparative advantage: network against network,
10 modern 
societies as a multitude of actors arrayed against those who would seek to 
tear their world asunder.
11 
It will be a world, nonetheless, that will demand more of foreign policy 
than counter-terrorism. Survival is not enough; extending a helping hand 
 
8  Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21
st 
Century, (New York: Little Brown, 1993), p. 3. 
9  Wolfgang Ischinger, “The Globalization of Justice,” Washington Post, September 
24, 2001, p. A19.  
10 Network is part of today’s Zeitgeist. RAND analysts David Ronfeldt and John 
Arquilla have done much to bring this term into the strategic discourse. See their 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Rand Report, 
2001), www.rand.org 
11  Germans might see this as Wehrhafte Demokratie plus Zivilcourage.  
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also has its merit. Sustaining development, democratization and peace—in 
other words, making globalization sustainable
12 — will, nonetheless, 
require a significant degree of success in the war on terrorism. For the 
United States and for Europe, the question of relative roles — whether in 
helping out or rooting out — will be an important one. Its importance is 
also clearly reflected in the US discussion of Europe’s role in the war on 
terrorism. 
2. Assumptions and Analysis 
Putting a number of this study’s operating assumptions on the table is an 
appropriate place to begin. The main arguments are as follows:  
-  Europe’s role is both important and contentious for the United States. 
-  More enduring geopolitical issues structure current transatlantic 
debates.  
-  Europe’s role in the war on terrorism must be multifaceted and rooted 
in its own comparative advantage. 
Europe’s significance in this effort is clear, not only because of its 
capabilities, but also because of its vulnerabilities. Most US observers 
clearly recognize that Europe is very much a part of the war on terrorism; 
Europe is simply too linked to the United States and the democratic, open-
market world not to be. Europe also offers an attractive alternate target set. 
“If America raises its defenses and its friends do not follow suit swiftly, 
softer European targets will become attractive to the terrorists,”
13 writes 
 
12  See Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the olive tree, (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1999). 
13  Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Terrorism is not just 
America’s problem and neither is the war against it,” Time International, September 
24, 2001. Jonathan Stevenson, of London’s International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, made a similar point in the Wall Street Journal: “As American territory 
becomes less vulnerable, terrorists will find Europe – as the United States' cultural 
and political cousin – a more attractive target of opportunity. In that light, vigorous 
European counter-terrorist policies are not only an alliance obligation but a matter 
of self-protection.” Jonathan Stevenson, “Terror Gap: Europe and the U.S. Head 
Opposite Ways,” Wall Street Journal Europe, April 9, 2002. 
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former Clinton National Security Council counter-terror expert, Daniel 
Benjamin. Indeed, where would Europe turn if the Vatican were hit, or the 
Frankfurt Messeturm, or the House of Commons?  
Cooperation may thus be essential, but this does not make it any easier. 
New challenges mean renegotiating roles. Being an integral part of the 
intertwined and vulnerable “civilized” world means having to deal with a 
host of potentially contentious international issues. Europe and America 
need to address these issues; a new set of understandings needs to be 
worked out. 
These contentious issues are a function of U.S. and European hopes, 
expectations and concerns about the other’s role. Counter-terror strategy, 
including homeland defense, is a new (and newly defined) priority. New 
substance and new forms have come to the transatlantic debate, but 
underlying and older patterns persist as well. September 11
th adds a new 
appliqué to what was already a very big and complicated world. It seems 
appropriate to start by briefly examining what U.S. counter-terror strategy 
is. Next, the larger, older question of Europe’s place in America’s world 
deserves brief mention.  
With the stage thus set, we can move to identify the implications of all this 
for U.S. views of European roles. Using a debate-based model of 
transatlantic relations can help to understand these implications. Certain 
fissures have long characterized transatlantic relations — at least in their 
geopolitical guise. Europe and America — operating within a community 
of interests and values reinforced by an increasing density of interaction — 
do have their differences. Unending but not unraveling, debates have long 
revolved around three basic geopolitical issues.  
First, what is the relationship between power sharing and burden sharing? 
Many say that America wants Europe to bear more burden, while Europe 
wants America to grant more influence. Certainly, Europe wants influence 
in Washington, and at a good price. This should not, however, detract from 
the other side of the equation. American wants influence in Europe, and 
also at a good price. Deals regarding burden and influence are the fabric of 
transatlantic relations, a fabric that is continually rewoven. 
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Second, what is the relationship between Europe and the world? Standard 
wisdom is that Europe wants America to focus more on Europe and 
America wants Europe to focus more on the world: for example, the 
“globalization” of European foreign policy, the involvement of NATO in 
distant „regional conflicts.” In reality, relative balance varies from issue to 
issue — from Kyoto to the World Trade Organization to the Taiwan Straits. 
The Europe-or-the-world debate comes in many manifestations, all the 
more so in today’s ever more interdependent world. 
Third, what is the relationship between the carrot and the stick? Here, 
observers hold that America is quick to the stick, while Europeans savor 
the carrot. Americans win wars, Europeans win the peace. True, Europe 
will not equal American military might any time soon, but that reality must 
not imply that views totally diverge on the appropriate balance between 
force and diplomacy. Divergence in outlook can come from divergence in 
capability. All the same, equal capabilities will not be forthcoming anytime 
soon (at least in terms of autonomous military action). Europeans and 
Americans must thus address the challenge of diverging outlooks in other 
ways. An open exchange of ideas, a concerted exploration of roles and 
options, can help to ameliorate the divergences. If the problem (and nature) 
of terrorism is a given, then common strategies should not be impossible to 
achieve, whether in terms of burden and influence, Europe and the world, 
and last but not least, carrot and stick.  
Geopolitics is not everything. Cleary, the dramatic increase in transnational 
and transgovernmental interaction has added a new dimension to 
transatlantic concert and controversy. Issues like consumer protection or 
environmental protection, child custody rights or the death penalty, anti-
trust or agriculture subsidies, health care or education, immigration 
schemes or pension reform — all these are of increasing international 
political importance. Numerous points of contact mean numerous points of 
potential friction. Debates about standards and „level playing fields”, 
debates based on values about domestic order, clearly make today’s 
transatlantic discourse both richer and more complex.  
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Older, more geopolitical questions nevertheless continue to shape the 
transatlantic relationship. As noted above, these questions relate to power 
and influence in a changing world, a world changed by the terrorism of 
September 11
th. Terrorism, by its nature, will increase the crosscurrents of 
exchange between the global and geopolitical and the transnational and 
domestic. The “tactical level” of counter-terrorism is not only about the 
hunt in far off lands, but about the vulnerability of one’s own society as 
well. Homeland defense — in an age of openness — is one of terrorism’s 
big new challenges. Linking the “first responders” on both sides of the 
Atlantic, whether immigration officials or fire fighters, will also be a 
transnational affair. Counter-terrorism, at least at the tactical level, will 
very much parallel the globalization model of production. Nor are such 
networks immune to controversy. Even in a network, coordination is also a 
question of who is coordinating whom. Counter-terror networks will rub up 
against each other in numerous and unpredictable ways, sometimes 
generating positive synergy, sometimes intense debate. This will not make 
the geopolitical issues of territorial influence and order go away, it will 
simply make them more complex.  
With the political landscape ferreted out, the study concludes with an 
examination of the various policy proposals that have emerged from the 
American discussion of Europe’s role in the war on terrorism. Needing to 
be both politically possible and strategically effective, such proposals can 
be grouped under seven themes: 
-  Political Solidarity 
-  Military Capability 
-  Intelligence Sharing 
-  Counter-Terror Law Enforcement 
-  Regional Conflict Resolution 
-  Homeland Security and Border Affairs 
-  Reality Check 
These proposals need to be seen against the backdrop of a US counter-
terror strategy that will be multidimensional and thus, multilateral. 
Transatlantically, integrative capacity will count as much as individual 
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capacity. Making war like one makes money, it will be network vs. 
network and Europe will need to put particular emphasis on its areas of 
comparative advantage. Transatlantic cooperation will spread into new, as 
yet uncharted territories, but it is hard to imagine it will be any less 
necessary during the next 50 years than it was during the last 50 years. 
II. High Noon? U.S. Counter-Terror Strategy 
“Chase ‘em down,” “smoke ‘em out,” “take ‘em, dead or alive” — even 
President George W. Bush was talking this way.
14 The world as the Wild 
West writ large — an American metaphor that captured well the mood 
across the country in the fall of 2001.
15 It was clear that strategy would 
have to adapt to a fast, open and lawless world of diffusing technology and 
complex interdependence, where the dividing line between foreign and 
domestic policy had just grown a lot less clear. Novel threats would require 
novel responses. In a networked age, it would be network vs. network. 
Counter-terrorism, like all strategies, would be about finding the right mix 
of policies — the right box of tools — to achieve the intended objectives in 
the face of the specific challenges. While the strategy that has developed 
since September 11
th has many shades, three bear mention; the strategy is 
American, it is multidimensional, and it is multilateral. 
1. American – “United We Stand” 
The body blows that came on September 11
th saw the Administration, the 
Congress, and the country pulling together in a remarkable showing of 
unity and determination. Seldom had this optimistic, pragmatic 
materialistic, post-modern and self-absorbed nation experienced such a 
 
14  See Dan Balz, “Bush Warns of Casualties of War, President Says Bin Laden Is 
Wanted ‘Dead or Alive’,” Washington Post, September 18, 2001. 
15 It was hunting season and High Noon to boot. Americans critical of Europe’s 
timorous role, like former CIA Director, James Woolsey, drew a more specific 
parallel, namely to Hollywood’s classic Western, High Noon, where the marshal 
(USA) gets no help from the cowardly townspeople (Europe). See R. James 
Woolsey, “Where's the Posse? It's high noon for the civilized world. Let timorous 
Europeans go home to their kids,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2002. 
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sobering moment. The roaring 1990s came to a screeching halt.
16 The 
world suddenly looked a lot more dangerous — and a lot more 
complicated. All the same, it was clear early on, and this was reflected in 
the polls,
17 that the novel nature of the enemy called for an equally novel 
response. Americans may not consider themselves sophisticated, but they 
do believe in being smart, quick thinking, innovative, even imaginative. 
United, they would stand up to this new challenge, and united they would 
stand it down. Everyone doing their part also meant everyone talking about 
strategy and ethics and what to tell children — the Internet was a froth with 
American and global discussion about  w h a t  t o  d o .  W h e n  i t  c a m e  t o  
strategy, it seemed everyone had an opinion. It would have to be broad 
ranging but focused, forceful but diplomatic, multilateral but 
unencumbered, at home and abroad. At any rate, to “prevail” America 
would need to find an American mix of policies, a mix politically 
sustainable at home and strategically effective abroad.
18  
Government by debate would not go away — even in this time of national 
unity. The Bush Administration has had much to debate — both within its 
ranks and outside them — since those intensely dramatic weeks of 
September. Big decisions have had to come fast but they have not always 
come easy.
19 Wide-ranging deliberation, if not controversy, has been a part 
of strategy formulation since the moment the planes struck.
20 As the initial 
shock wears off, policy debates will grow more open, more partisan, and 
more normal. Still, the new intensity and focus of foreign policy, in a 
 
16  “Our self-indulgent narcissism and voyeurism — displayed endlessly on American 
television — must yield to something sterner.” Eliot Cohen, “A Strange War,” The 
National Interest, No. 65s, 2001, pp. 11-22, p. 21. 
17  See Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Seem Committed to Winning War on Terrorism,” 
The Gallup Poll Monthly, November 2001. 
18 For a comprehensive and broad outline of counter-terror strategy, see Kurt M. 
Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the 
Campaign Against Terrorism, (Washington: CSIS Press, 2001).  
19  Dan Balz and Bob Woodward,  “America's Chaotic Road to War: 
Bush’s Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack,” 
Washington Post, January 27, 2002. 
20 James Mann, “The Bush Team Shares a Vision But Not How To Reach It,” 
Washington Post, September 30, 2001.  
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nation very suddenly concerned about world affairs, will likely continue 
well past the one-year anniversary of the September 11
th attacks.
21 
Partisanship is a part of America’s political landscape, but today’s differing 
views also reflect the terra incognita in which the country finds itself. The 
anthrax assault and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
showed a new side to conflict. Americans recognize that a faceless global 
enemy will be a tricky one to track down. The novelty of the threat is one 
of strategy’s biggest challenges. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
gets a hearing when he says: “We ... are going to have to fashion a new 
vocabulary and different constructs for thinking about what it is we're 
doing.“ And his Commander-in-Chief, President George Bush, reads from 
the same page: “Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy 
campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.“
22 
Strategy will be tentative and testing, open minds will need to prevail.
23 A 
concerted and determined nation will still need a flexible, adaptable, 
“upgradeable“ strategy. All the same, in contrast to the 1990s, “where 
policies proliferate(d) without strategy,”
 24 America is suddenly more 
focused. The special interests, above all those on the fringe, are having a 
tougher time pushing through their narrow agendas.
25 Economic 
turbulence, Enron, November’s 2002 mid-term elections, and a host of 
other potential surprises will divert the attention of this angered America, 
but the urgency of repelling the next attack will not fade soon. 
 
21  See “America’s New Internationalist Point of View,” The Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press,” October 24, 2001, www.people-press.org/102401rpt.htm 
22 Cited in William Arkin, “A New Mindset for Warfare,”  washingtonpost.com, 
September 22, 2001. 
23  “Americans Open to Dissenting Views on the War on Terrorism; September 11 
Shock Slow to Recede - 42% Still Depressed,” The Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, October 4, 2001 http://people-press.org/ 
24 “It is therefore not a promising sign that after 1989, as in 1919, the American 
foreign policy debate appears to be subsiding again into a standoff, while policies 
proliferate in the absence of strategy.” Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: 
American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 2001), p. 320. 
25  Jackson Diehl, “Pendulum Shifts In Foreign Affairs; Special interests lose their 
grip,” Washington Post, October 1, 2001. See also “The Mood of America: What 
September 11
th really wrought,” The Economist, Jan. 10, 2002. 
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Opinion polling shows a determined public, willing to make sacrifices, 
willing to fight.
26 “But the same polls that indicate public support for both 
air and ground action in the fight against terrorism also show that 
Americans would much rather engage in conflict as part of an international 
alliance than unilaterally.” Clay Ramsey, of the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland continues, “Americans don't 
want to be the world's policeman, but they do want a more orderly and 
livable world and are ready to participate in creating that.”
27 This 
multilateral preference has long been seen in public opinion polls in regard 
to the use of force.
28 A green light from the UN Security Council (Gulf 
War) or the 19 veto powers on NATO’s North Atlantic Council (Kosovo 
War) can tip the scales domestically into support for military action. Even 
in the case of a causus beli as clear as that against Taliban and Al Qaeda, 
the White House was surely quite happy to get unanimous support from the 
UN and NATO. The impression of international acquiescence, if not 
support, will likely remain a precondition for getting the U.S. public to 
back assertive, even violent action against perceived threats — including 
that posed by Iraq. On this, a transatlantic gap of sorts has emerged: the 
American public seems to be satisfied that the campaign is being conducted 
 
26  See, for example, Dana Milbank and Richard Morin, “Public Is Unyielding In War 
Against Terror: 9 in 10 Back Robust Military Response,” Washington Post, 
September 29, 2001. 
27  Karen DeYoung and Dana Milbank, “Military Plans Informed by Polls Carefully 
Chosen Words Prepare Americans for Potential Toll in Ground War,” Washington 
Post, October 19, 2001. See the Program on International Policy Attitudes website, 
www.pipa.org, for more recent evidence of this ingrained multilateralism. 
28 Speaking of “sustained internationalism,” a 1999 Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations report concludes: “As in all previous surveys, support for an active role 
for the United States in the world remains strong, with 61% of the public and 96% 
of leaders favoring such activism.” And speaking of a “preference for 
multilateralism,” the report stated, “Seventy-two percent of the public and 48% of 
leaders think the United States should not take action alone in responding to 
international crises if it does not have the support of allies.” American Public 
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, www.ccfr.org 
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by a “coalition;”
29 the European public, by contrast, is not so much of this 
opinion, instead continuing to see Bush as a unilateralist.
30 
Two-thirds of the American public has long held that the U.S. must be 
internationally engaged, with vital interests existing around the globe.
31 
This internationalist inclination among the broader public has risen since 
September 11
th.
32 More importantly, however, Americans now take foreign 
policy much more seriously. Support for multilateral internationalism was a 
‘mile wide and an inch deep’ on September 10
th — in other words, it had no 
salience. The Gallup polling organization has noted that the number of 
those saying foreign affairs “extremely important” has risen from 17 
percent in January 2001 to 52 percent in October, 2001.
33 Selling 
international partnership to this public should not be too difficult. What to 
do with this pronounced new interest in foreign policy and the high levels 
 
29  Speaking on the occasion of the six-month anniversary of September 11
th, President 
Bush focused squarely on the “coalition.” See “President Thanks World Coalition 
for Anti-Terrorism Efforts.  Remarks by the President on the Six-Month 
Anniversary of the September 11
th Attacks,” Office of the Press Secretary, March 
11, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov 
30  “Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration has stressed the 
importance of Allied contributions to the war on terrorism. In particular, the 
Administration has made clear the need for help from scores of countries around the 
world to hunt down terrorists, cut their communications, eradicate their financial 
networks, eliminate their bases of operations, and dry up their recruiting pools. The 
Pew/CFR/IHT findings suggest that while the Administration’s public diplomacy 
campaign may be playing well in Peoria, it isn’t doing as well in Paris.” “Americans 
and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues; Bush's Ratings Improve But 
He's Still Seen as Unilateralist,” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 
April 20, 2002, www.people-press.org 
31  op cit, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. 
32  “The terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan have created a new internationalist 
sentiment among the public. There is much more support for a multilateral foreign 
policy than before Sept.11, with roughly six-in-ten (59%) now saying that the 
interests of allies should be taken into account by U.S. policymakers. By about a 
two-to-one margin (61%-32%) the public thinks that taking an active role in the 
world, rather than becoming less involved, will be a more effective way of avoiding 
problems like terrorism in the future. And support for assertive U.S. leadership also 
has grown, with as many as 45% saying that the United States should either be the 
single world leader or at least be the most active of leading nations.” “America’s 
New Internationalist Point of View,” op cit.  
33  “What has Changed, What Hasn’t,” October 29, 2001, www.gallup.com 
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of support for President Bush’s performance is a more vexing question. 
Political capital can only be spent so many times; one must hope that 
President Bush will use his wisely. 
Accompanying the determination, unity, sophistication, and multilateralism 
of America’s understanding of the war on terror are a few more 
idiosyncratic elements. To start with, visitors to America can hardly fail to 
notice the flags — symbols of patriotism, determination, sorrow. The flags 
are hung, it seems, as a personal act of remembrance and respect, and also 
as a showing of spirit and unity. Writing the flags off as simple American 
jingoism would be unfair and incorrect. Indeed, there is a strikingly multi-
ethnic face to America’s mourning, an almost reflexive reach for tolerance 
and empathy — not least in regard America’s 2 million-strong Arab 
community.
34  
There are also the more dysfunctional traits. America, argues Washington 
Post columnist, E.J. Dionne, is “bipolar” (a gentler synonym for “manic-
depressive”). He says “…yes, the United States, like all powerful countries 
throughout history, can become arrogant in its might and self-deluding 
when it assumes that everyone wants to be like us. But the real danger lies 
in what might be seen as a national bipolar syndrome. This entails a 
tendency to ignore our virtues entirely at some moments, and to see 
ourselves as the only virtuous nation on earth at others. Oscillating wildly 
between self-doubt and hubris is a bad idea for nations, as for 
individuals.”
35 Others have warned of national “attention deficit 
disorders,”
36 i.e., that a proliferation of policies with no overarching 
strategy is still America’s default setting. 
The United States’ sudden awakening to “catastrophic terrorism” will, 
nevertheless, leave a deep mark on the American mind. September 11
th’s 
brutal corroboration of yesterday’s Cassandras will also reinforce a more 
 
34  See “Post September 11 Attitudes: Religion more prominent; Muslim-Americans 
more accepted,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 
6, 2001, www.people-press.org 
35 Ibid. 
36  Fred Hiatt, “America's Attention-Deficit Disorder…” Washington Post, September 
24, 2001. 
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fundamental realization: “if you don’t do the world it will do you.” 
Americans can also be expected to recognize something else: counter-
terrorism is a necessary, but not sufficient component of foreign policy. 
Survival is not enough. America, if history is any guide, will also seek to 
inject a little “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” into the affairs of 
the world. 
2. Multidimensional: Network vs. Network 
Multidimensionality is not headline grabbing. The CNN camera teams may 
not portray it as dramatically as bunkers being blown apart around Bagram 
airbase; as U.S. Special Forces on horseback, with laser designators 
unleashing lightening bolts from the sky; or even as a Kabul of kite-flying 
children and women, walking the streets, unveiled and smiling. 
Nevertheless, counter-terror strategy is nothing if it is not multidimensional 
— the perspective of the television camera notwithstanding. Military force 
certainly has its part, and it, too, is newly multidimensional in the context 
of its own Revolution in Military Affairs — but the military is only one 
piece of the larger strategic mosaic.  
When it comes to this mosaic’s many pieces and to their relationships and 
relative relevance to one another, opinions will be many — in America and 
across the Atlantic. So will questions: What is the connection between 
winning wars and winning the peace? Between precision-strike and nation-
building? Between information dominance and peacekeeping? Between 
commandos ambushing Al Qaeda fighters and financial cyber-sleuths 
trapping money launderers?
37 When do law-enforcement officers talk to 
intelligence officers? Should more money go to “first responders” like 
firefighters and policemen or to public health and civil defense or to the 
 
37  Following terrorist money trail is one area where network strategy is particularly 
important. Dan Hamilton writes: “Outside the glare of headlines that routinely focus 
on transatlantic squabbling, the United States and its European allies have been 
forming their own complex, almost invisible and somewhat unconventional network 
of cooperation that has become the foundation of joint efforts to freeze terrorist 
funds, toughen financial transparency measures, and bring aggressive threats of 
sanctions to those not cooperating.” Daniel S. Hamilton, op cit. 
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(soon to be defunct) U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service? Neither 
can one ignore the need to come down one way or another on a multitude 
of related international questions, for example, India and Pakistan, or Israel 
and Palestine.  
In today’s globalized world, open borders are both a blessing and a curse. 
A Revolution in Border Affairs is thus every bit as important as a 
Revolution in Military Affairs. This is as true of the enlarging European 
Union
38 as it is of the United States. The White House web site on 
responding to terrorism puts it this way: “Each year, more than 500 million 
people are admitted into the United States, of which 330 million are non-
citizens. On land, 11.2 million trucks and 2.2. million rail cars cross into 
the united States, while 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls in U.S. 
ports annually.”
39 Close relations and increasingly open borders between 
Mexico and Canada imply, in particular, the need for a North American 
border management system.
40 Border affairs are also about bankers 
agreeing on new multilateral measures to deprive the world’s Aum 
Shinrikyos and Medelins of their financial sustenance — and doing so 
without clogging the arteries of global investment. Border affairs are about 
local police working together in new ways with federal law-enforcement, 
immigration and intelligence officials to develop new rules of engagement 
for tracking and trapping terrorists. Border affairs are also, and very 
fundamentally, about a nation’s information space, its information 
infrastructure — and here, there are an infinite number of border 
crossings.
41 Sophisticated filters and firewalls, global web cams, pervasive 
 
38  See International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Expanding the EU: The Debate 
Over Border Management,” Strategic Comments, Vol. 6, Issue 9, November 2000. 
39  See www.whitehouse.gov/resonse  
40  ”Although the United States has renewed its focus on homeland defense following 
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, true security will require the United States to 
implement a continental defense system with Canada and Mexico.” See, “War Plan 
Series Part 3: North American Theater of Operations,” Sep 26, 2001, 
www.stratfor.com 
41  A thought provoking discussion of the broad-ranging implications of cyberstrikes 
can be found in James Adams, “Virtual Defense,” Foreign Affairs, May-June 2001, 
pp. 98-113. 
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computing — it will be a world made more transparent in defense of a 
world more open.
42 
The complexity of the challenge is a reflection of the complexity of our 
world. It is a world more connected, but by no means more monochrome. 
Globalization does not mean homogenization, much less Americanization. 
Instead, it is driven by the eclectic search for comparative advantage, for 
synergy and symbiosis in what is, fortunately, more often than not a 
positive-sum world. Globalization, at its core, is about interconnected 
diversity – e pluribus Unum. The Information Revolution, the Age of 
Internet, complex globe-spanning networks, systems of systems. To take 
down the bad guys, you have to understand them; you also have to 
understand the terrain: „to degrade, defeat and destroy twenty-first century 
terrorist networks, we must learn to fight as a network ourselves, one with 
global reach and an ability to bring to bear at the right time the right tool 
for maximum effectiveness.”
43  
If “network vs. network” is one defining characteristic of counter-terror, “at 
home and abroad” is another. Harvard political scientist Stanley Hoffman’s 
assertion that “nothing is purely domestic or purely international 
anymore,”
44 holds true for much of our world, but particularly for 
terrorism. In addition to portions of the supplemental $ 40 billion 
Emergency Response Fund appropriated by Congress in September, 2001, 
the FY 2003 “war” budget Bush submitted to Congress in January 2002 
puts $ 38 billion into Homeland Defense, almost doubling what had already 
been steep increases on national infrastructure protection and homeland 
defense during the Clinton Administration.
45 Consolidating this task under 
a single authority was initiated with the designation of Governor Tom 
 
42  “By embracing pervasive computing as part of its defensive strategy in this war, the 
United States would be using networks to fight networks.” See David Ignatius, 
“Netting Bin Laden,” Washington Post, November 11, 2001. 
43  Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for 
the Campaign Against Terrorism, op cit, p. 26. 
44  Stanley Hoffmann, „On the War,“ New York Review of Books, 1 November 2001. 
45 See Anthony H. Cordesman, “The New American Approach to Defense: The 
FY2003 Program Notes on Homeland Defense, Counterterrorism, Asymmetric 
Warfare, and Force Transformation,” February 6, 2002, www.csis.org 
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Ridge as Director of a new Office on Homeland Security on September 20, 
2001; some nine months later, the President asked Congress to create a new 
department, tasked with pulling some 100 different government agencies 
under one roof, the Department for Homeland Security, while retaining the 
independence of both the CIA and the FBI. Homeland defense is also a 
military/non-military mix — culturally, if not constitutionally — with 
uncertain new domestic roles for America’s soldiers, including for 
example, 8000 National Guardsmen keeping watch on airports across the 
land.
46 
U.S. counter-terror strategy is multidimensional in another key aspect. It 
focuses on both state and non-state actors, on Taliban and Al Qaeda, on the 
government of Iran and Uzbekistan’s Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization 
(MKO). President Bush’s January 2002 “axis-of-evil” State of the Union 
speech sought to show the connection between problematic (if not evil) 
governments, technologies of mass destruction and globe-spanning, non-
state terrorist networks. The relative importance of the elements of this 
triangle — and their relationship to each other — is debated within the 
United States, and more so across the Atlantic. The strategic forecasting 
outfit in Austin, Texas, stratfor.com, puts it like this: “the issue of state 
sponsors of terrorism, [is] a key source of disagreement between 
Washington and Brussels. The United States and Europe are close allies in 
the war against terrorism. They have expanded efforts to share intelligence, 
collaborate on tracking the financial networks of militant groups and arrest 
alleged terrorists. But as Washington attempts to bully or coerce suspected 
state sponsors of terrorism in political and security matters, Europe is less 
likely to want to help.”
47  
Addressing this gap would be easier, some would say, if the United States 
would be a little less “unilateralist.” Phil Gordon and Nicole Gnessetto, of 
the Brookings Institution in Washington and the European Union’s Center 
for Security Studies in Paris, teamed up to make the following argument:  
 
46 Thomas E. Ricks, “Military Grapples With New Role in Homeland Defense,” 
Washington Post, September 29, 2001.  
47 “EU Terrorism List Creates Harmony, Rewards and Problems,” May 3, 2002, 
www.stratfor.com  
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One key drawback of the re-emergence of American unilateralist and 
military instincts is that it provides a pretext for Europeans to ignore the 
very real problem – the potential nexus between terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction – that the Americans are worried about. The more the 
Europeans concentrate on U.S. attitudes and statements, the more they 
avoid seriously assessing the threat. 
48 
The “nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” is also 
clearly a function of the way particular states position themselves vis-à-vis 
certain terrorist groups, whether those states are within an “axis of evil” or 
outside of it. Iraq may top the most-wanted list, but other states can make 
trouble as well. 
However much controversy reverberates back and forth across the Atlantic 
when it comes to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, the matter remains a cluster of 
tough unanswered questions in the United States as well. It is not so much 
the need for “regime change” as the when and how: Before the mid-term 
elections or after? Before UN inspections have failed or after? Following 
six months of intense build up in the theater, or twelve months of slower 
movement? With a coup or without? With the Kurds and the Shiites or 
without? With airpower and Special Forces or with an occupying army?
49 
With peacekeepers or without? With nation building or without? With 
casualties or without? And more geopolitically: with Palestine burning or 
not? With Saudi Arabia and Egypt or not? With Russia and China or not? 
With Europe or not? Debate on Iraq revolves around the reality that there 
are no easy answers
50 and the reality that the debate has been going on for 
long while.
51 The importance of keeping the Europeans (or at least Britain) 
abreast and on board also moves with the larger currents of U.S. debate on 
 
48 Nicole Gnesotto and Philip H. Gordon, “It's time for a trans-Atlantic summit,” 
International Herald Tribune, March 13, 2002. 
49  Jim Hoagland, “Surgical Strike vs. Mass Attack,” Washington Post, September 19, 
2001. 
50  Serge Schmemann, “If Hussein Is Next, Experts Say, Do It Fast,” New York Times, 
January 6, 2002. 
51  See “Paul Wolfowitz, velociraptor,” The Economist, Feb 7
th 2002. 
  23Andrew B. Denison 
the future of Iraq.
52 This will continue; the Mideast and its problems will 
not go away; America and Europe will sometimes disagree over how to 
engage terrorist challenges the newly formed multilateral Mideast fire 
brigade, the “Quartet” (United States, European Union, Russia, United 
Nations) notwithstanding. 
Counter-terror strategy is also multidimensional in its larger implications 
for the evolution of world order. Henry Kissinger speaks of novel 
opportunities on this front in arguing that: “[t]he war on terrorism is not 
just about hunting down terrorists. It is, above all, to protect the 
extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international 
system. The North Atlantic nations, having understood their common 
dangers, can turn to a new definition of common purposes.”
53 Jim 
Hoagland, two-time Pulitzer Prize winning foreign policy columnist at the 
Washington Post  echoes this sentiment, saying, “the way in which the 
campaign is conducted, and the long-term goals it serves, can establish new 
organizing principles and priorities for international relations for years or 
decades to come. The roles that democracies and dictatorships will be 
called on to play in the American agenda of the 21
st century will be made 
clearer by this conflict.”
54 
That counter-terror strategy must consist of a new and complex mix of 
elements is clear in the United States. It is not just a military problem; on 
this there is no doubt. All the same, much is in need of debate. The right 
mix of multidimensionality needs to be found and it needs to be kept up to 
date. Competing goals need to be reconciled. A multidimensional strategy 
across a broad front, harnessed to America’s new determination, and 
seeking a global coalition of coalitions whether at home or abroad, must 
thus also be multilateral.  
 
52  Michael R. Gordon, “Blair supports U.S. on Iraq,” New York Times, March 12, 
2002.  
53  Henry Kissinger, “Where Do We Go From Here?” Washington Post, November 6, 
2001. 
54  Jim Hoagland, “A Test of True Allies,” Washington Post, November 8, 2001.  
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3. Multilateral: Mission or Coalition? 
“We will rally the world,” said President George Bush.
55 Ground zero was 
still a smoldering, fiery mountain of twisted steel as US coalition building 
went into overdrive. The world’s leaders passed solemnly through 
Washington and New York; Bush administration point men fanned out 
across the globe. Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell, the ying and yang of 
American diplomacy, landed in one capital after the other, seeking to 
construct a global coalition against terror. The world did truly rally, at least 
for a short while. In this way, the world also became a smaller place —
American unilateralism notwithstanding. Americans have many reasons for 
not wanting to be overly “entangled” by international commitments and 
institutions. To say that September 11
th is one of these would be to 
misunderstand the impact of that event on American foreign policy and 
public opinion. 
In the immediate aftermath of the attack and still reeling from the shock of 
what had transpired, the Bush national security team set out to build a 
broad front against terrorism; to put the political pieces into place before 
going on the warpath (the turning of Pakistan being a particularly notable 
achievement). But it was more than just the impending war in Afghanistan. 
America’s bilateral relations with most states suddenly found new 
definition. Knowing who is doing what in all of the world’s 200 sovereign 
states has just become a lot more important for the United States — and the 
State Department is keeping score in what it calls the “mother of all 
matrixes.”
56 With Al Qaeda cells suspected in some 70 countries, America 
will seek to engage the world’s governments with new intensity. If 
preventing imminent attack means acting in lieu of those governments, 
America will be so inclined. Nor is this engagement limited to today’s 
suspects. A new level of international engagement does not (yet) mean a 
new agreement on the nature of that engagement. How much to rely on 
 
55  Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, 'We Will Rally the World' Bush and His Advisers 
Set Objectives, but Struggled With How to Achieve Them,” Washington Post, 
January 28, 2002.  
56 Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “Bush Awaits History's Judgment: President's 
Scorecard Shows Much Left to Do,” Washington Post, February 3, 2002. 
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others to prevent the next attack has not been uncontested within the 
administration’s ranks. It has been one of the central questions of strategy 
formulation since the attacks.
57 Indeed, it has long been a central 
controversy of American foreign policy. 
Something in America’s nature seeks global partnership — also in war — 
whether for good or bad. America’s desire for limited government, for 
foreign policy on the cheap, and for averting causalities
58 explains this in 
part. The inclination also has a down side: “pacts with devil,” the U.S. 
alliance with Stalin’s Russia to win World War II being the prima fascia 
case. The United States has usually gotten the better side of the deal in the 
wars it has collectively fought over the last two-and-a-half centuries, 
whether compared to Lafayette and his fellow French during the American 
Revolution or to the Triple Entente and the Allied Powers of the 20
th 
century’s two world wars. Alliance with Stalin was a heavy price to pay, 
but the United States was the war’s only real victor. In the ensuing Cold 
War, many a shady character again joined America’s campaign, doing 
America’s dirty work. Yesterday’s friends have often become today’s 
enemies. Washington once ostensibly helped Bin Laden against the 
Soviets, now Washington relies on the Northern Alliance. Tomorrow, it 
will be someone else.
59 
Of late, the less dirty work of peacekeeping and nation building is 
something Washington would also rather leave to others. Equally 
important, allies are a valuable source of political legitimacy. This kind of 
burden sharing has its preconditions though, at least according to the 
editorial line of the New York Times. 
Washington still expects other nations to participate in such vital tasks as 
economic reconstruction and peacekeeping and to help confer diplomatic 
 
57  Steven Mufson and Thomas E. Ricks, “Debate Over Targets Highlights Difficulty 
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About Diplomatic Fallout,” Washington Post, September 21, 2001. Also see 
William Kristol, “Bush vs. Powell,” Washington Post, September 25, 2001. 
58  On the continued importance of casualty aversion, see Richard Cohen, “The Cost of 
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and political legitimacy on governments secured by American military 
action. For those practical reasons, the interests of other countries cannot be 
ignored. A stable world order must be built on a broad international 
consensus, not American military action alone.
60 
Multilateralism may be more American than commonly assumed, but 
multilateralism, particularly in the sense of commitment to international 
institutions and treaty making, has not always had a popular place in the 
government of George Bush, or in some quarters of Congress.
61 All the 
same, responding to the September 11
th attacks, the United States, joining 
with Great Britain as senior ally,
62 sought and received United Nations and 
NATO endorsement for a very broad range of military action under Article 
51 of the UN Charter. Already on the morning after the attacks, George 
Bush and Tony Blair “…agreed it was important to first move quickly on 
the diplomatic front to capitalize on international outrage about the terrorist 
attack. If they got support from NATO and the United Nations, they 
reasoned, they would have the legal and political framework to permit a 
military response afterward.”
 63 With Tony Blair attending the President’s 
September 20
th war speech to a joint session of the United States Congress, 
George Bush would also say of Great Britain, “America has no truer 
friend.”
64  
President Bush’s speech set an important first marker of where American 
strategy was going and why. Widely regarded as a very significant moment 
in the Bush presidency, the speech drew strong praise across the political 
spectrum. It was there that Bush also laid down his famous dictum: “with 
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us or against us.”
65 While some might interpret this formulation as too 
black-and-white, it is still very much in line with Bush’s desire to „rally the 
world.” There is an “us” that is more than the United States of America, an 
“us” that comes in many forms. Secretary of State Colin Powell, testifying 
before the Senate, put it thus in regard to the “coalition:” “We have said let 
each contribute according to your ability to contribute, your willingness to 
contribute, and the situation you face within your country.”
66  
The Rumsfeld corollary to Powell’s flexible coalition adds the 
controversial “the mission will define the coalition.” Rumsfeld, writing in 
the New York Times at the end of September, 2001, put it this way: “This 
war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of 
defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating 
coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have 
different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide 
diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. Some 
will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may 
help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the 
coalition — not the other way around.”
 67 
 
65 President Bush: “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and 
isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, 
unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, 
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Still, there would be a coalition. Indeed, calls for a new multilateralism 
were heard all around. Former President George H.W. Bush said: “Just as 
Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could 
somehow avoid the call to duty and defend freedom in Europe and Asia in 
World War II, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the 
concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight 
against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.“
68 Brent Scowcroft, 
George H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor, and now head of the 
National Intelligence Council, urged America to “build a coalition”
69 and 
model the Gulf War’s diplomatic accomplishments. Henry Kissinger 
proclaimed a new opportunity, if not imperative, for international 
cooperation: “The attack on the United States has produced an 
extraordinary congruence of interests among the major powers. None wants 
to be vulnerable to shadowy groups that have emerged, from Southeast 
Asia to the edge of Europe. Few have the means to resist alone.”
 70 Indeed, 
it was precisely the nature, duration and magnitude of the threat that left so 
many Americans in an almost reflexively multilateral mode. 
Catastrophic terrorism is very much a long-term problem. In decades 
hence, America may no longer be “Mr. Big,”
71 with a fifth of the world’s 
economy, or half of its Internet users, as it was at the turn of the 
Millennium. Better the world’s rising powers be America’s friends than 
not. Daniel Benjamin, once counter-terror expert on the Clinton National 
Security Council, now at the Center for Strategy and International Security, 
speaks of this long-term perspective: “…as President Bush and those 
around him have said repeatedly, the fight against terror will take 20, 30, 
even 50 years. America needs to keep an eye on that horizon, which means 
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making the case for international order in the company of the international 
community.”
 72 Some, understandably, remain concerned that the United 
States is not making that “case” actively enough. A variation of the 
multilateralist argument comes from those wanting a leaner (if not 
Libertarian) foreign policy: “The United States will be more secure, and the 
world more stable, if America now chooses to pass the buck and allow 
other countries to take care of themselves.” If treating America’s allies like 
“adults” cuts America’s current global expenses, so much the better, they 
argue.
73 
Criticism of U.S. unilateralism, heard so often before September 11
th, was 
briefly dormant in the aftermath of the attacks; it soon returned, both in the 
United States and abroad. Specific complaints about the Administration not 
doing enough to bring in the European allies were clearly part of this 
critique. The Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland was one key voice, his 
columns again and again bemoaning “our underutilized allies.” Notably, 
Hoagland has not only called for more efforts to bring the allies in but also 
for early military action against Iraq.
74  
Responding to this outbreak of multilateralism, a chorus of more 
unilateralist voices countered that much of the fight against terrorism had to 
be done alone or it would not be done at all.
75 Getting bogged down in 
consensus building is their fear — especially when the consensus is not 
seen as bringing any plus in capabilities. A strong current of thought in the 
United States has long been concerned about the country getting tripped up 
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by European foot dragging.
76 This rendition of the world resonates 
particularly well with the more conservative, more Republican 
constituencies across America.
77 
A variation of this theme argues that a muscular “go-it-alone” attitude is 
actually, paradoxically, an essential catalyst of international cooperation. 
This is a particularly good argument for winning over the more 
multilateralist spirits. The Carnegie Endowment’s Robert Kagan suggests 
that father Bush’s war against Iraq is very much such a model: “It was a 
policy of multilateralism, but preceded, as effective multilateralism must 
always be, by a unilateral determination to act.”
 78 Leadership issues are 
very much a part of the American foreign policy discourse. Many 
Americans see international cooperation flowing from strong leadership, 
that is, from the United States’ willingness to take initiative and risk. A Pax 
Americana, if not a Pax Atlantica, is not an entirely foreign idea to many an 
American. America may be a “reluctant sheriff”
79 or a “reluctant 
imperialist,”
 80 but it leans that way nonetheless. 
 
76 The  New York Times quotes a “senior” administration official: "The fewer people 
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page warned about coalition compromises: “…the greatest danger to the war on 
terrorism is not that the Bush administration will resort to unilateralism. It is that the 
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There is an underlying American confidence that the U.S. political process 
is capable of generating good decisions and that with such decisions, the 
world in general, and the Europeans in particular, can be brought around to 
supporting them. Not that this will be easy. “President Bush, and the 
American public he leads, should not assume that our allies see the world 
in the same way we do. Hearts and minds in Europe are winnable, but they 
must, in fact, be won day after day after day.”
81 In sum, U.S. thinking on 
the role of international cooperation might be described as an ambiguous 
mix of caution and enthusiasm. Or as the Economist writes: “…the reality 
is that America will likely remain torn between pressure to be a global 
policeman and accusations that it is thus a global bully.”
82 The debate 
endures, even as the terms change. Americans will continue to be uncertain 
about how strongly they should commit themselves to intimate and 
entangling relationships with other states. Nevertheless, they will engage, 
often actively. 
If there is an underlying American reluctance to get entangled, then 
perhaps it is best to make a virtue of this necessity. This reluctance can be 
seen as a reality check on Washington’s more imperial instincts. In a world 
that daily generates new reasons to cooperate both internationally and 
transnationally it might not be bad to see America’s reticence as a way to 
leverage a little economy, a little selectivity, a little “strategic elegance”
83 
into the foreign policy of this 21
st Century hyperpuissance. “The War on 
Terrorism will require a form of ultra-engagement by the US in the world. 
The 'hyper-intervention' that the initial battles on terrorism will demand, 
will potentially impose on America a pro-consular role to which it is 
unaccustomed.”
84 If this forecast, made by the prestigious annual conclave 
of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, is accurate, then 
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America’s cautioning voices might indeed be a valuable guard against 
excess. 
4.  The Politics of Bush’s Post-September 11
th Multilateralism 
Within days of the September attacks, one of the Bush Administration’s 
must vexing conundrums would become this: finding a proper balance 
between international cooperation and effective action.
85 In the unfolding 
campaign against terrorism, Bush would need to “triangulate” between a 
fickle public and a stubborn world. With passions running high on both 
fronts, finding the right balance was and remains no easy task. 
At home, Bush faces a US public, traditionally capricious if not 
disinterested in foreign policy, now engaged and resolute. Sober 
determination — but of uncertain duration. How to use this opportunity, 
how not to squander it on endeavors that run-aground, whether because of 
too much international cooperation or not enough, this is thus the challenge 
for Bush and his Administration. Too many “Black Hawk Downs”
86 and 
America’s current multilateralist internationalism could quickly fade. Even 
worse, Bush could see multilateralism going from a source of legitimacy 
for assertive action, particularly regarding the use of force, to a scapegoat 
for the inevitable setbacks. 
 
85 Dan Balz of The Washington  Post identified early on the type of challenge 
President Bush would face: “President Bush enjoys the support of a broad 
international coalition and an extraordinarily united country as he launches a war 
against terrorism. But as the campaign unfolds, almost every decision he makes 
could risk unraveling that coalition and eroding his political support at home. 
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managing the multiple aspects of the crisis, according to diplomatic, military and 
political analysts. They said he must balance the need to show progress in pursuing 
the terrorists with the patience required to preserve a coalition of countries with 
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Bush,” Washington Post, September 25, 2001. 
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Putting together an international coalition is no easy task, especially if you 
happen to be the Hyper Viper. September 11
th, it seems, has not made the 
world any less wary of American preponderance. The Unipolar Moment,
87 
noted almost a decade ago, seems to be becoming more unipolar by the day 
— by pretty much whichever standard of power you use (other than 
keeping airplanes out of buildings and Sharon out of Palestine). Many 
Americans have nevertheless also observed that not all the consequences of 
such a unipolar world are beneficial. Advocates of the “blow back”
88 theory 
warn that America might be needlessly provoking other states to cooperate 
in their opposition to American aims. Many Americans would agree with 
Stanley Hoffmann: “A determined project of ridding the world of all rogues 
and terrorists is a dream that would be seen abroad as a demonstration of 
rabid imperialism. The US has to be more modest in its goals.”
89 
These sentiments have not gone unnoticed within the Bush team. During 
the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate Bush even used them to poke at 
the Clinton-Gore foreign policy. Bush’s call for a “humble” US foreign 
policy gained notoriety. “I don't think they should look at us with envy,“ 
said candidate Bush of the rest of the world. “It really depends upon how 
our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation, 
they’ll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. 
And our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And 
that's why we’ve got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that 
promotes freedom.“
90 
Ten months in office and contending with the deadliest attack America had 
ever experienced — one that could have easily taken out the White House 
and the Capitol instead the of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon — the 
President took time to talk with Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, 
also about the charge of unilateralism: “People respect us, but they like to 
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tweak us. People respect America and they love our values, but they look 
for every excuse in the world to say that, because we didn’t do exactly 
what, you know, the international community wanted, we became 
unilateralist.”
91  
Bush’s plain talk about the rest of the world is the subject of much 
interpretation, both at home and abroad. Even within his own cabinet, his 
words mean different things to different people. Bob Woodward’s account 
of the first big post-September 11
th strategy session shows some of the 
dynamic within the administration when it comes to the role of allies. 
Powell noted that everyone in the international coalition was ready to go 
after al Qaeda, but that extending the war to other terrorist groups or 
countries could cause some of them to drop out. 
The president said he didn’t want other countries dictating terms or 
conditions for the war on terrorism. ’At some point,’ the president said, ‘we 
may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America.’ 
Powell didn’t reply, but going it alone was precisely what he wanted to 
avoid if possible. In Powell's view, the president's formulation was not 
realistic. The United States could not launch an effective war in 
Afghanistan or worldwide without a coalition. He believed the president 
made such statements knowing they might not withstand a second analysis. 
The tough talk might be necessary but it was not policy. 
In contrast, Cheney took the president at his word, and was convinced the 
president was absolutely serious when he said they would go it alone if 
necessary.
92 
Since September 11
th, many in the United States have criticized Bush for 
not putting enough multilateralism into his foreign policy. Simultaneously, 
others have praised him for seeking greater international cooperation — 
provoking others to criticize him for doing the same. Sometimes Bush gets 
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good marks, sometimes bad, though his popularity in the polls has held at 
the unprecedented 80 percent plus range since the attacks.) Five weeks 
after the attack, Time held forth: “There has rarely been such a sudden and 
dramatic shift in American policy and tone. An Administration that just a 
month or two ago emphatically believed in going it alone — walking away 
from treaties, pushing its missile-defense scheme no matter who said what 
— has thrown open its arms to embrace the pleasures of multilateralism.”
 93 
Bush’s November decision to involve European troops more directly in 
Afghanistan was another such intimate embrace that found wide praise.
94 
The New York Times welcomed the move, arguing that, “the addition of 
these forces, some of which may be involved in combat operations, will 
render military decision-making more cumbersome. That is an acceptable 
price for ensuring the diplomatic solidarity needed to sustain an extended 
and difficult armed campaign.”
95 
Others were less ready to pronounce a new era of multilateralism, 
especially in Europe. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s efforts to be involved 
were seen by some Brits as behavior more fit for a poodle. The Financial 
Times spoke more soberly of “Doubts over Bush’s policy conversion.”
96 In 
Washington, Brookings Institution analysts, Ivo Daalder and James 
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Lindsay, writing in the International Herald Tribune, criticized Bush for 
being only “tactically” multilateral, and thus „shortsighted.” “In seeking to 
eliminate potential constraints on U.S. freedom of action, the 
administration gains a free hand today at the likely cost of losing needed 
partners tomorrow.”
 97 Three months later, the same Daalder and Lindsay 
would write in the Financial Times: “Sometimes it pays to complain. When 
European officials denounced George W. Bush’s ’axis of evil’ speech, US 
commentators and officials dismissed the criticisms as another case of 
’euro-whining’. Yet in the intervening weeks something odd has happened: 
the US has moderated its policies in several areas to accommodate 
European concerns.”
98 
The back and forth will continue, buffeting the Bush Administration this 
way and that. Sometimes one current predominates in America, sometimes 
another. In the same way, the world will call America one way one day, 
and another way the next. Whatever the prevailing shades of 
multilateralism, one should not forget the big picture: multidimensional 
problems require multidimensional solutions. The nature of terrorism as a 
threat, if not the nature of the interdependent world on which it feeds, will 
often confront George Bush with what Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher 
referred to as TINA: There Is No Alternative.
99 Parts of the country might 
be dragged kicking and screaming, but there seems little choice but more 
multilateralism. As American Arabist Fouad Ajami observes, “It is both 
heartbreaking and ironic that so quintessentially American a figure as 
George W. Bush — a man who grew up in Midland, Texas, far removed 
from the complications of foreign places — must be the one to take his 
country on a journey into so alien, so difficult, a world.”
100 
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III. Europe’s Place in America’s World 
While the American debate over Europe’s role in U.S. strategy is often 
framed in terms of “unilateralism” and “multilateralism,” America is not 
and has never really been a unilateralist power — at least by any simple 
historical standard of great power behavior.
101 “In the end, what is 
historically unique about American leadership is not its power but its 
ultimately self-denying purpose.”
102 The United States has sought 
international partnership more often than not. A preference for pluralism 
explains part of this, a preference rooted in a conception of state that sees 
limited government as good government; that sees checks and balances on 
power as the key to preventing power’s abuse; that sees the avoidance of 
monopolies as important in all walks of life. As such, it is a preference also 
rooted in the fear that a predatory policy abroad would lead to a police state 
at home. Americans have long sought a foreign policy on the cheap, not 
just to save a buck but to preserve basic liberties, to preserve America’s 
fragile democratic experiment.
103 More positively put, Americans do not 
believe they have a monopoly on truth, only that they seem to have found 
the best system to approximate it. A liberal political philosophy that sees 
truth as tentative, but progress as possible, should be open to partnership 
and pluralism. 
Young for a country — but old by the measure of continuous constitutional 
government — the United States has now stood as the world’s strongest 
nation for almost a century. But it has not stood alone. During this 
American 20
th century, as in the less American 19
th century, and indeed 
since the Declaration of Independence in 1776, America’s fate has very 
much been tied to that of Europe. Certainly, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America have all had their importance, but they have never eclipsed 
Europe in significance. As democracy has taken hold on the old continent 
— first in Western Europe, and with the end of the Cold War, deep into 
Europe’s eastern reaches — this transatlantic bond has only deepened. 
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It is hard to see how this will not also hold true in the coming decades of 
the 21
st century, a century begun with the rude awakening of September 
11
th. Europe and America share the challenge of surviving and flourishing 
in this unfolding age of rapid globalization. They find themselves together 
in a world of connectivity and vulnerability, a world of awesome wealth 
and burgeoning poverty, a world of overpopulation and 
underdevelopment. It is a world of borders ever more open to the 
multiplying factors of wealth and production, and a world of borders ever 
more open to the multiplying means of mass destruction. 
A world of millions of private actors means a world of virtually unlimited 
vulnerability. This is, paradoxically, especially frightening for the United 
States, the country that has done most to destroy borders and walls, to 
shape a world market, to promote freedom of communications, 
information, and movement.
104 
The enticing opportunities of this ever-smaller world — whether it be 
making a buck or saving a soul — inspire cooperation. The dangers of this 
ever-smaller world demand it. Cooperation across borders will often be 
profitable; it might well also be existential. It is hard to imagine Europe and 
America not cooperating in the face of what the future seems likely to hold 
— both good and bad. More proactively, it is hard to imagine how global 
order could depend on anything else but a Pax Atlantica. 
Whatever one makes of the long litany of transatlantic troubles, when 
searching for partners, the United States has most often turned to Europe. 
There is indeed some logic to this. Common interests grow out of common 
political ideals and institutions, and out of integrating open-market 
economies. Common interests also grow out of common vulnerabilities and 
threats. In today’s world, the threat of mass destruction is shared. This was 
true on September 10
th and it will remain so for many decades to come. A 
fundamental unity on substance thus outweighs the many differences over 
style, strategy and tactics. America, on balance, can accomplish more with 
Europe than without it; thus, America, on balance, prefers a stronger 
Europe to a weaker Europe. Full stop. 
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Europe can empower America when its political support adds to the 
legitimacy of American action; when it generates the political will to pay 
the price of its own international engagement; and when it fields its own 
effective (military and non-military) global order and crisis-management 
capabilities. Europe will certainly ask a price for such contributions; 
Americans will understandably complain that this price is too high. But in 
the end, the two are more likely to strike a deal than not. 
The onset of the 21
st century sees America and Europe growing together, 
not apart. Investment and information flows; tourism and trade; educational 
exchange and scientific collaboration; all the linked interest groups that 
constitute the crazy quilt of international civil society (including the 
globalized anti-globalization movement); these and much more make for an 
ever-denser web of transatlantic relations. Europe and America are the core 
of globalization, their respective societies tightly networked across a broad 
array of ever wider ranging activities. This impetus will persist; the ties will 
multiply. Open borders and open societies are at the heart of democratic 
civilization; they are the source of its wealth and its identity. Defending this 
openness is the common challenge. 
IV. The Atlantic’s Geopolitical Rifts 
America is not Europe. Common interests should not be confused with 
identical interests. Strife abounds. Differences are as natural an element of 
this partnership as of any other. The ongoing debate between America and 
Europe has long run along basic fault lines. An understanding of the more 
enduring geopolitical rifts within the transatlantic relationship can help put 
current conflicts into proper perspective. The transnational has not (yet) 
superceded the geopolitical, only made it more complicated. Geopolitical 
differences continue to underlie the relationship, issues that in many ways 
pattern those of yesterday. These can be divided into three overarching 
themes: burden sharing and power sharing; Europe and the world; carrot 
and stick. 
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1. Burden Sharing and Power Sharing 
The central issue of the transatlantic partnership revolves around the 
question of burden sharing and power sharing. As in any other partnership, 
reaching agreement on relative roles and influence is essential. Such 
agreement often comes with a good deal of creative ambiguity. Each side 
naturally wants to carry less burden and enjoy more influence. New 
political challenges continually reopen the debate, so too in regard to the 
war on terrorism. Nevertheless, given the choice between a strong Europe 
and a weak Europe, Washington would, as noted above, clearly choose a 
strong Europe. Indeed, many Americans express frustration, even ridicule, 
when Europe cannot agree amongst itself on security issues, as was the 
case at the Laeken European Union Summit in December 2001.
105 
Friction often arises out of the need to agree on a fair sharing of burden and 
influence. Another part of the debate is caught up in differences over the 
definition of burden and influence. Contributions to common goals can take 
many forms: precision ground strikes flown off distant aircraft carriers—or 
rolling up a cell of Al Qaeda operatives about to poison the US embassy 
water supply in Rome.
106 Influence can be perceived or real, latent or 
manifest. Often exercised discreetly, a discrete variable it is not. 
Burden Sharing: Who Does What? 
Three general categories nevertheless suggest themselves when thinking 
about burden sharing in the pursuit of international peace and security. 
These revolve around the provision of legitimacy, will, and effectiveness. 
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Legitimacy 
Fundamental to the democratic process is the quest for legitimacy. In 
today’s globalized world, accountable government needs to be accountable 
not only to its own citizens, but also in some way to international partners. 
If a nation or a group of nations wants to impose its will — particularly by 
force — upon another nation, it will tend to seek international legitimacy 
for this act (whether the nations be democratic or not). The average 
American, at any rate, is much less reluctant to use military forces if close 
allies are also in support.
107 A green light from the UN Security Council is 
not essential, but it certainly helps. If it can be 15-0 as it was on September 
12, all the better.
108 A green light from NATO’s 19 + veto powers 
(democracies the entire lot) is also an important source of legitimacy.
109  
For America, Europe thus bears a significant burden when it provides 
political support, thereby lending greater legitimacy to American actions, 
both in the United States and among other international audiences, 
particularly in the Arab world.  
Will 
Legitimacy is in turn related to political will. Legitimacy can generate 
political will, but legitimacy alone is not enough. Governments and publics 
must see an action as urgent; they must be willing to pay the price — in 
political capital, if not in blood and treasure — to achieve the objective. 
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One reflection of relative political will in regard to international affairs is 
what the respective partners spend — on diplomacy, defense and 
development. Another might be the openness of their markets to foreign 
goods, or the activity of the non-governmental organizations. In whatever 
guise, bearing the transatlantic burden is very much related to expending 
political capital to generate political will.  
Effectiveness 
Finally, legitimacy and will are in some way a function of the effectiveness 
of the means at hand. Are the strategies and the crisis reaction capabilities 
(whether military nor non-military) up to the job? Is there a match between 
means and ends? How good is one at bringing peace to war zones? Can the 
transatlantic engagement in the Balkans be considered a success? 
(Germany’s role in Amber Fox looks good, but how many more Balkan 
stabilizations are the Europeans up to?) Alternately, how effectively can 
one engage the world’s other powerful capitals, whether Moscow, Beijing, 
Delhi, or Jakarta, to support a world order conducive to transatlantic 
interests and values? In sum, what kinds of products are on offer? Does 
their effectiveness make them worth the price?  
A great deal of friction arises out of the need to agree on a fair sharing of 
the burden, whether defined in terms of, legitimacy, will, effectiveness, or 
in some other manner. But burden is only one side of the coin, influence is 
the other.  
Power Sharing: Which Way and How? 
Who has what role in defining the common objectives? What kind of say 
do Europeans and Americans have when it comes to how the objectives are 
pursued? Generally, the Americans are dissatisfied with the “limited” 
burden the Europeans are carrying, and the Europeans are unhappy about 
the “limited” influence they wield in Washington. Americans know 
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Europeans fret about their lack of leverage.
110 Americans also suspect a 
European desire to exercise influence disproportional to the burden borne. 
To turn an old slogan on its head, Americans want to give Europe “no 
representation without taxation.”  
Institutions 
The pattern of influence across the Atlantic has come to be defined by 
international institutions. Such institutions tend to be (among other things) 
one-state, one-vote affairs, thereby giving weaker states proportionately 
greater influence. Luxembourg has more say inside NATO than outside. 
Policy makers in Washington hear Europe’s concern about a lagging U.S. 
commitment to international institutions. They also know such institutions 
give European governments greater leverage in Washington than they 
would otherwise have. All the same, Washington plays an active role in 
such institutions. Its commitment to them has been long and broad. 
The legitimacy, consensus and norm-building role of institutions is not 
without value to America. The United States fathered many of today’s most 
important international organizations. A multilateralist streak runs deep in 
the American body politic. NATO remains central to America’s war on 
terrorism,
111 if not always directly, then still through its ability to foster the 
“human interoperability” that makes multinational operations possible 
(whether in NATO or outside it), its role in bringing peace to the Balkans, 
its relationship with Russia and its Partnership for Peace program 
extending into the eastern reaches of Europe and Central Asia. NATO’s 
consultative bodies will play an increasingly important role in managing 
multilateral missile defense and all the other proliferation problems that 
need to be commonly addressed. NATO will remain a wellspring of 
expertise on peacekeeping. Finally, NATO is also an important forum for 
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the United States to pressure the Europeans into putting a lot more effort 
into building (i.e., buying) 21
st century crisis management capabilities.
112 
Foreign-policy-through-institutions nevertheless poses a dilemma for 
Washington. There is a tradeoff between inclusivity and effectiveness. 
There is also a strong unilateralist current in America that maintains that 
inclusiveness is overrated, that the price in effectiveness of achieving it too 
high. They see multilateralism, and the commitment to international 
institutions and agreements it implies, as an unnecessary constraint on 
American action, as tying the Republic down like a Gulliver among 
Lilliputians. Multilateralism is for „wimps.”
113 Here, too, Europeans enjoy 
pride of place. Never willing to pull punches, conservative columnist 
Charles Krauthammer puts it such: „If the Europeans refuse to see 
themselves as part of this struggle, fine. If they wish to abdicate, fine. We 
will let them hold our coats, but not tie our hands.”
 114 
Old Habits in a New World 
America may not always live up to Europe’s expectations when it comes to 
multilateralism; some speak of the U.S. as an a la carte multilateraliste. 
But by the historical standards of great-power politics, America is uniquely 
multilateral.
115 For the United States, diplomacy has very much been 
‘defining one’s own interests such that other states see them as in their 
interest as well.’ American influence, argues Joseph Nye Jr., Dean of 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, is based on its “soft” power, on 
its ability to get others to want what it wants.
116 This component of 
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American foreign policy is also rooted in traditions of state (and strategic) 
restraint.
117 In a country where limited government is good government, 
getting other countries involved can also be a way to keep one’s own 
government less involved. Pluralism, pursued in the aim of reconciling 
competing interests while limiting government’s central authority, does not 
stop at water’s edge. The American system of government is open to 
outside influence; there are numerous points were lobbies can exert 
leverage, whether on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Access is 
available — but it is not entirely free. 
Influence, at any rate, is still a function of the „product” Europe can 
contribute — however much potential (market) access there might be.
118 
Such a European-made “application” or “solution” (to use today’s 
parlance) does not have to be “identical” or “equal” to that of the United 
States — nor should it be. That lesson was learned with Ricardo and ideas 
like “gains from trade” and “comparative advantage.” Europe’s box of 
policies and capabilities will be of greatest value to Washington if it 
provides a complementary kit — not just a low quality copy. Niches 
abound where Europe could play a valuable role and win commensurate 
influence. These span a broad spectrum of military and non-military 
contributions. Wherever they may be found, it seems clear that more 
influence can be won in Washington with complementary capabilities that 
generate synergy, than with those autonomous capabilities that simply 
allow one to “go it alone.”  
Today’s world increases the demand for these synergies. Interdependence 
increases the premium on cooperation. Fighting terrorism, whether foiling a 
planned attack, or combating broader causes, is by nature a challenge that 
requires an unprecedented degree of international teamwork. The United 
States will continue to seek this teamwork; it will want close partners; it 
will be willing to extend them influence; but it won’t want to sell itself 
short. The nature of burden and influence in an increasingly interdependent 
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world will not be static. Interpenetrating societies and their internationally 
linked interest groups broaden and complicate political decision-making. 
International politics becomes a „three-dimensional chessboard”
119 where 
burden and influence are constantly redefined. Questions of burden and 
influence will nevertheless remain at the center of transatlantic relations. 
The relative amount of attention given to Europe and to the world will 
continue to play a particular role in the debate over these two issues. 
2. Europe and the World 
A second central issue of transatlantic relations revolves around the 
geographic focus of foreign policy. To generalize: the United States seeks 
to involve Europe around the world; Europe seeks to involve the United 
States in Europe and around its periphery. Certainly, the United States has 
long seen Europe as its primary partner and as the most important piece of 
real estate on the planet — outside the territory of the United States. And, 
as argued above, the ties multiply by the day. There are nevertheless those 
Americans who see Europe as too concerned with itself to be concerned 
about the world. They see Europe as parochial and provincial, as unwilling 
to consider global stability as its bailiwick. Europe, for them, is not so 
much empowering as encumbering. Transatlantic relations will benefit if 
Europe can more successfully counter this caricature, if it can demonstrate 
that its horizons are both global and broad. 
Another dynamic also plays into America’s perceptions of Europe 
relationship with the larger world. The European Union, if at a tortoise 
pace, is extending its reach into Europe’s East, from the Baltics to St. 
Petersberg, from Kiev to Tbilisi to Tashkent. The European Union is an 
open club — in theory, if not in practice. Open borders and the 
accompanying diffusion of political and economic practices imply the 
possibility of a Greater Europe extending far beyond the current 15 
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members of the European Union. Europe could prove to be a very large 
magnet indeed, and this would attract America’s attention as well.
120 The 
open-ended character of the European project thus also leaves open the 
nature of the relationship between an ever-larger Europe and an ever-
smaller world. At the same time, and perhaps because of the complexity of 
ordering Greater Europe and its volatile periphery, Europe often seems out 
of breath and at odds with itself when it comes to foreign policy. Whether it 
is the fault of an overloaded agenda or just a bad case of political gridlock, 
Europe has yet to live up to its ambitious foreign policy aspirations. 
Limping along as it does, Europe nevertheless seems to have no choice but 
to become a „global player.” Europe’s own material well-being, if not its 
security and demography, are increasingly tied up in global developments. 
And it just so happens that Europe’s closest partner, the United States, has 
the globalization game down pretty well. 
The Atlantic agenda remains essential, but the United States will want to 
frame it in more global terms — all the more so now that counter-terrorism 
has risen to the top of the U.S. political to-do list. Whether on EU or 
NATO enlargement, or the Partnership for Peace, or the Korean Energy 
Development Organization, the United States hopes Europe’s capitals will 
globalize their foreign policy, so as to share in the global burden. NATO’s 
geographic reach, already contested before September 11
th, will once again 
be the subject of transatlantic debate. The US leans toward a globally 
capable NATO despite concerns about the veto power of NATO’s 
increasing numbers. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld lays down a 
global marker for NATO in saying: „The only way to deal with a terrorist 
network that is global is to go after it where it is.“
 121 The nature of the 
terrorist threat may push the United States to give the Europeans a better 
listen, but it should also push the Europeans to see security in more serious 
and more global terms.  
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Across the board, local developments are increasingly conditioned by the 
global context. Law enforcement and immigration policy, international 
commerce and border controls, banking regulations and insurance liabilities 
— all of these underline how domestic and foreign policy are two sides of 
the same coin. The demands of domestic policy will thus increasingly push 
Europe into a global role. This role will not be one equal to the United 
States, but it will be one unequaled by any other country in the world but 
the United States. Superpower or not, Europe is clearly a global power. 
Europe’s 20
th century isolationism (and its bloody civil wars) will 
hopefully come to be seen as an aberration of what has otherwise been a 
significant contribution to global civilization. 
3. Carrot and Stick 
A third major issue of transatlantic relations concerns the proper balance 
between force and diplomacy. In its simplified version, the Americans are 
quicker to reach for the stick; the Europeans tend to prefer the carrot. 
Recent history has much to do with this. Europe’s postwar peace was based 
on reconciliation and rapprochement, first in Western Europe and then 
across the Iron Curtain. Interdependence and integration, not balance of 
power and military might, have come to be seen by much of Europe as the 
building blocks of international order. This leads some Americans to 
conclude that Europe is overly wary of confrontation and overly inclined to 
buy off adversaries (i.e., give in to extortion and thereby motivate more of 
it).  
The uproar in Europe following George W. Bush’s designation of Iraq, Iran 
and North Korea as an Axis of Evil, whose development of weapons of 
mass destruction might justify preemptive military action, is one reflection 
of this underlying carrot-and-stick difference.
122 There is much argument in 
Washington about the wisdom of using force to remove Saddam Hussein, 
but the gap across the Atlantic is wider. At another level, this is a debate 
(and a dilemma) about whether to focus on the immediate threat or the 
underlying cause. Should Al Qaeda be ruthlessly pursued, even at the 
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expense of alienating Arab populations? Should one work with the 
governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to round up suspects, or should 
one seek to bring about a replacement of those governments with more 
democratic alternatives? What is the proper balance “between prevention 
and preemption?”
123 Europeans and Americans tend to differ on this. 
Americans feel more vulnerable. Draining the swamp takes time; those 
coiled to strike have to be stopped now. 
At another level, this transatlantic rift reflects itself in American and 
European views (and roles) in regard to the winning of wars and the 
winning of the peace. The assumption has established itself that Americans 
are better at taking states down and Europeans are better at building nations 
back up.
124 In theory, one could hope that both would be equally involved 
in each aspect of crisis reaction.
125 The concern is not invalid that a “good 
cop, bad cop” division of labor leads to diverging strategic perspectives, 
and in turn, to the erosion of common objectives.
126 America could do 
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better at seeing the need for taking an active part post-conflict stabilization. 
“We should learn a lesson from the previous engagement in the Afghan 
area, that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has 
been achieved,“
127 said none other than President George Bush, much to 
the chagrin of the anti-nation-building wing of the Republican Party. Yet 
the Pentagon seems reluctant to put ground forces into a policing, 
peacekeeping, nation-building role in Afghanistan — or Iraq for that 
matter. Whether President Bush will also endorse the good-cop role, and 
keep the United States engaged „after a military objective has been 
achieved” remains to be seen. But the question is also whether Europe can 
do better on the bad-cop side of the balance sheet. 
At one level, this Euro-American difference is about strategy and style, but 
at another, it is about capabilities. Simply put: America can do more 
diplomacy, Europe cannot do more force. Even if Europeans were to 
become more willing to endorse the use of force, their overall capabilities 
would still lag behind those of the United States. Even if European defense 
spending were to rise significantly, a decade of under-funding (particularly 
for investment) and hefty US spending increases, mean that the gap will 
continue to widen for a number of years. When it comes to burden and 
influence in regard to fielding modern forces, the European terms of trade 
are not that good. All the same, better capabilities can only add to European 
influence in Washington and — one could imagine — to American 
multilateralism around the world. 
For now, a certain division of labor, and a clear difference in scale, is thus 
unavoidable. The challenge is to manage this asymmetry. Part of such 
management means making a virtue out of necessity: Europe may regret its 
“cleanup role,”
128 but right now this role happens to be its comparative 
advantage. Role specialization is not an entirely foreign idea in today’s 
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globalized world. Sometimes it leads to isolation; more often it is an 
incentive for cooperation. Synergy arises out of differences as much as 
similarities. Increasing defense spending is one thing, increasing it 
intelligently to maximize synergies is another. On military matters, Europe 
will need to bring certain specialized cards to the table if it wants to stay in 
the game, but it won’t have to show up with a full deck.
129 Dispute will 
continue over the relative role of force; military cooperation will remain 
necessary but contentious. The transatlantic debate over the carrot and the 
stick will endure. 
V. American Expectations 
The United States clearly seeks a stronger, not a weaker Europe. In the 
words of Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in Colin Powell’s 
State Department: “We understand that a more capable and independent 
Europe will sometimes disagree and go its own way, but this is a small 
price to pay compared to the benefit of having a strong partner to help us 
meet regional and global challenges.”
 130 This also means the United States 
trusts Europe to pursue compatible and complementary policies more often 
than not. How might America define such a cluster of compatible and 
complementary European policies in the war on terrorism? What might 
such expectations imply for Europe’s role and partnership with the United 
States in the larger, more global project of securing liberty, prosperity and 
peace in a world of growing vulnerability?  
These expectations would above all reflect the predominant American view 
that the Atlantic Community remains as imperative in the first half of the 
21
st century as it was during the second half of the 20
th century. At this 
level, most in the American foreign policy community would agree that 
“…transatlantic cooperation is relevant to every aspect of the fight against 
terrorism. Together, the United States and the EU possess most of the 
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economic, technological, military and diplomatic resources for waging this 
global campaign, and are the two reliable pillars of stability in the 
world.”
131 Transatlantic unity and strength of purpose is the preferred 
option.  
At a lesser level of generality, the American landscape of hopes and 
expectations becomes more complex. For one, American hopes for Europe 
vary with hopes for America and its own role in the world (e.g., is 
insularity or overextension the greater danger?). The subtleties and shades 
of American multilateralism move with the times; the multidimensionality 
of counter-terrorism has multiplied the possible policy combinations out of 
which an optimal strategy can be made. As such, one thing is clear: Europe 
cannot satisfy all the expectations of all of America’s competing political 
agendas. In trying to make every American constituency happy, Europe 
would only anger them all.  
There will always be sniping — from both sides of the Atlantic. Beneath 
the crossfire, there will also be concurrence on basic fundamentals. 
America’s political class, it seems, also agrees on certain benchmarks when 
it comes to Europe’s role in this new war on terrorism. President Bush, for 
one, has said he is keeping score: “All the time, we're reminding people 
that this is a performance-oriented world — if you want to win the war on 
terror, you must perform… You asked a very interesting question: Do you 
keep a scorecard? And the answer is, I do. I do, because I'm an old baseball 
guy and I like to keep the score. I like to see who’s performing and who's 
not performing. It's a part of being a coalition.“
132 Whether keeping score 
or identifying benchmarks, Americans have certain expectations about 
Europe’s role in the anti-terror coalition.  
Europe’s role must be multifaceted and rooted in its own comparative 
advantage. It should less mimic than complement America’s role. A 
„smart” division of labor between Europe and America is something 
Americans would largely want — recognizing as they do, that Europe and 
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America are not identical. As Simon Serfaty of CSIS said in testimony 
before the European Parliament, „Granted that doing nothing is not an 
option, the goal is not to do everything together but to make sure that 
together we do everything.”
133 Specific European contributions to make 
sure together everything gets done, and gets done as effectively as possible, 
suggest themselves in seven different areas.  
-  Political Solidarity 
-  Military Capability 
-  Intelligence Sharing 
-  Counter-Terror Law Enforcement 
-  Regional Conflict Resolution 
-  Homeland Security and Border Affairs 
-  Reality Check 
1. Political Solidarity 
Political solidarity stands at the top of many priority lists. Debased, such 
solidarity would be little more than fawning acquiescence, but Americans 
do not see solidarity as vassal-like deference. They see it as legitimacy in a 
more pluralist context. Europe’s political solidarity only really counts if it 
is voluntary, or at least based on more refined notions of “soft power” and 
common agendas. While the United States may enjoy a surfeit of strength, 
the legitimacy of its application is another matter — and not just abroad. 
America is more willing to take initiative in the world when Europe lends 
its political, if not moral, support. Some, like Anthony Cordesman, even 
argue that right now, this is more important than any military contribution. 
“It is transatlantic political unity and support that will be most important in 
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this contingency (Afghanistan), rather than the levels of force Europe 
contributes.”
 134  
Americans also broadly realize that this political solidarity will not be 
forthcoming unless the “urgency gap” on terrorism and the threat of mass 
destruction can be rectified. It is widely held in the United States that the 
Europeans do not take the danger of today’s terrorism seriously enough, 
thinking instead that it is a mere variation of the kind of terrorism 
Europeans have known and lived with for decades. The Washington Post, 
commenting on the outcome of the annual Munich Security Conference, in 
February 2002, put it this way: “The biggest surprise… may have been the 
clear disconnect between the two sides about the urgency of the 
situation.”
135 Jackson Janes, Director of the American Institute of 
Contemporary German Studies, thus calls on Europeans to give heed to the 
seriousness of America’s concern, if not to the problem of terrorism itself: 
“Germans and Europeans should acknowledge the degree to which 
Americans’ perception of the world has changed owing to September 11. 
“…just as in the EU, where member states are inclined to accommodate the 
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one that frames an issue in terms of vital national interests, so too should 
the allies concede the intensity of American interests on this issue.“
136  
Political solidarity means more than political leaders acknowledging the 
gravity of America’s position. It means European leaders bringing their 
publics along as well. Daniel Benjamin warns: “The leaders of America's 
NATO allies understood the magnitude of the moment and the reality, to 
paraphrase Article V of the alliance's charter, that this attack against one is 
an attack against all. For their own safety and the defense of our common 
civilization, Europe's peoples must see this as well.”
137 Some would deride 
this as simply helping the US engage in multilateralist “window 
dressing,”
138 but it still counts among most Americans. Moreover, this 
“window dressing” occurs at a time when many Americans would see the 
nature of today’s terrorism as a strong argument for not going it alone.  
There are, of course, those who see the autonomy forsaken as a price too 
high, who would ask Europe not to “tie America’s hands.” Richard Perle, 
Chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, speaks for them when 
expressing wariness over bringing the Europeans into any military action 
against Iraq.
139 Some do see European solidarity as consisting of little more 
than staying out of America’s way. “No more Kosovos.” These 
rejectionists remain in the minority, at least if measured by the intensity of 
transatlantic cooperation that has developed since  September 11
th. This 
intensification has occurred in spite of the Bush Administration’s rejection 
of many of the new treaty-based forms of cooperation preferred by the 
other Atlantic allies. And even Americans sympathetic to the land-mine 
treaty or the International Criminal Court might argue that it is better that 
the Bush administration focus finite political capital on Israel and Palestine, 
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or India and Pakistan, or nuclear weapons in the hands of madmen. In this 
sense, many Americans would have some sympathy for Kagan’s pointed 
question to the Europeans: “Can a more liberal international order be built 
by hobbling the most powerful defender of that order? That's a question our 
European allies might want to start asking themselves.”
140  
Such requests to refrain from “hobbling” the United States may not fall on 
welcome European ears. European solidarity may not come easy, but in the 
end, it can also contribute to giving the kind of multilateralism Europe 
wants a better name in the United States. According to Jackson Janes and 
Jeffrey Anderson: „The German and European preference for 
multilateralism cannot be allowed to manifest itself largely in elliptical 
processes that perpetuate inaction or irresolution. Multilateral processes 
must lead to effective outcomes. Put another way, Germans, and by 
extension Europeans, must convince the U.S. that acting multilaterally is in 
its interest.”
141 This is better done by being a strong partner than a weak 
critic.  
2. Military Capability 
Europe’s ostensible weakness is most often associated with its military 
capabilities, which seem increasingly dwarfed by those of the United 
States. Americans want a stronger Europe — particularly on the military 
front. The complaint, moreover, goes beyond the question of deployable 
(and interoperable) forces. Many Americans hold the impression that 
Europeans are much less willing to endorse the use of force (or at least 
American force), which gets back to the question of European political 
solidarity. These complaints somehow coexist with the recognition that 
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effective, non-military responses. Above all, critics need to explain how entrenched 
terrorist infrastructure around in the world can be neutralized using non-military 
means.” Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson, op cit. 
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Europe has lots of forces deployed in difficult overseas duty. As such, low 
levels of high-tech combat power and low levels of spending also seem to 
be a more symbolic problem. For European „neglect” of its defenses could 
also imply that the Europeans do not think military force important, or even 
legitimate. This would be a problem if Americans read it as such: ”our 
closest friends don’t think we have a right to defend ourselves.” By the 
same token, many Americans express concern that differing military 
capabilities will lead toward differing strategic worldviews; that the good 
cop and the bad cop will not see eye-to-eye. As such, the symbolic value of 
certain European military policy decisions should not be underestimated.  
Those Americans that call for higher European defense spending are 
motivated at least in part by their desire for Europe to curb America’s 
unilateralist temptations. It is not the American unilateralists that want the 
European posse armed.
142 Increased European defense spending, argues 
Jackson Janes, “…will be expensive and politically controversial at home, 
but if the initiatives are not undertaken, there can be no mystery about U.S. 
desires to 'go it alone’.”
143  
American entreaties for a more militarily capable Europe also go beyond 
calls for higher defense spending, with U.S. observers acknowledging 
Europe’s fiscal conundrum. George W. Bush, speaking on May 23, 2002, 
before the German Bundestag in Berlin, called for the required “financial 
commitment,” but he also put his finger on concrete efforts the Europeans 
could make: “mobile and deployable forces, sophisticated special 
operations, the ability to fight under the threat of chemical and biological 
weapons.”
144 Americans urge Europe to increase military effectiveness (and 
signal political will) in innovative and collaborative ways. “…it is critical 
 
142  Charles Krauthammer puts it like this: “If Europeans want to rearm and join the 
posse, fine. But we should not be pressuring them. America neither resents nor 
inhibits European strength. On the contrary. For a half-century, we supported the 
project of European integration and enlargement. For almost as long, under the 
rubric of "burden sharing," we urged the Europeans to increase defense spending.” 
“Re-Imagining NATO,” Washington Post, May 24, 2002. 
143 Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson, op cit. 
144 “Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag,” May 23, 
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that our allies succeed in refocusing their defense efforts – if need be by 
pooling their resources to do collectively what they are unable to do 
individually.”
145 Europe should also place greater emphasis on special 
niche capabilities and priority improvements as a way to get more for their 
money: “…while Europeans cannot hope to match American defense 
expenditure, they will need to spend more on secure communications, air 
lift, special operations and dealing with chemical and biological 
battlefields. Not all these tasks require the vast expenditure on weapons 
platforms that are in the American budget”
146 In other words: think 
European, close bases, shut down assembly lines — rationalize the 
production of European security.  
Finally, one should remember that Europe will not only be asked to help 
win wars, but also to help win the peace. European experience in the 
Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and elsewhere is something American 
observers can also appreciate. This ‘other side’ of military capabilities 
flows directly into the task of regional conflict resolution addressed below. 
Military capabilities, however employed, are nevertheless but one aspect of 
a much broader effort to defeat terrorism. 
3. Intelligence Sharing 
Military capabilities are of little value if you do not know who the enemy is 
or where to find him. Intelligence is the essence of counter-terrorism — 
and that means getting the right information to the right place at the right 
time. Revamping intelligence capabilities thus implies greater emphasis on 
sharing and networking and interoperability. This is important 
domestically, in the context of homeland defense, as US Congressional 
investigation into the intelligence failure that was September 11
th has 
shown. Sharing and networking is equally important with the intelligence 
capacities of other countries. Europe, where the operational planning for 
the September 11
th attacks took place, is no exception. Stratfor.com, the 
 
145  Richard N. Haass, “Charting a New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship,” op 
cit. 
146 Joseph S. Nye, “NATO remains necessary,” op cit.  
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hard-nosed strategic forecasting company based in Austin, Texas, 
underlined the importance of such cooperation, writing a week after the 
attacks:  
The views of these countries carry enormous weight in the war the United 
States is planning to wage. A critical part of that war will be the covert 
operations that will be virtually global in scope and will rely heavily on 
cooperation from the intelligence and security services of other countries. 
The wholehearted cooperation of Germany, France and Egypt are 
indispensable for such an intelligence war.
147  
Not that intelligence sharing is easy. Mistrust abounds, even among allies. 
Leaks can be political bombshells. Still, certain practices have developed, 
particularly in the context of NATO, that could be significantly expanded 
upon. “NATO exists as an effective framework for coordinating 
preparations in the security area,” maintains Joseph Nye, arguing that, 
“(m)ore will need to be done in coordinating intelligence, preparing 
defenses against cyber attacks and sharing best practices in making 
homeland security more robust in NATO member nations.”
148 NATO itself 
could evolve into a homeland defense organization, starting as an 
information exchange, but also taking a hand in coordinating the myriad of 
transnational domestic defense tasks that will come to comprise a 
significant part of NATO’s new Article V responsibilities. This would also 
involve tighter coordination with the EU in a range of new areas, 
particularly law enforcement. 
4. Counter-Terror Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement, increasingly tasked with preventing as well as 
prosecuting terrorism, is a national but also very much a European Union 
responsibility. Americans have become very aware of the way in which 
terrorists moved in Europe.
149 “Now… there is a direct organic relationship 
 
147 “The Limits of Solidarity,” September 18, 2001, www.stratfor.com 
148 Joseph S. Nye, “NATO remains necessary,” op cit.  
148 Steven Erlanger, “Missed Signals on Sept. 11: Militant’s Story in Europe Came Too 
Late,” New York Times, December 29, 2001. See Peter Finn and Sarah Delaney, 
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between European and American security. Europe was used as a launching 
pad for the worst terrorist attack in history. Securing its territory against 
terrorist infiltration would shrink that option.“
150 One could even go so far 
as to say, “…it is by now accepted on both sides of the Atlantic that the 
global counter-terrorism campaign will hinge far more on vigilant law-
enforcement and intelligence than on the rare headline-grabbing military 
campaign à la Afghanistan.”
151 Americans see Europeans bringing with 
them a different kind of terrorist experience, and certain ingrained law 
enforcement habits for dealing with it. Threat perceptions differ as does the 
price of action; European governments will tread carefully in view of large 
Arab populations. All the same, Americans expect much of the Europeans 
when it comes to rolling up terrorist networks across the expanding 
European Union.
152  They will also want the Europeans on board when 
efforts are undertaken to make international norms and legal foundations 
compatible with combating terrorism.
153 Europeans also have to think about 
the juridical status of terrorists in terms of domestic law and the 
international law of war — are they criminals or combatants? 
5. Regional Conflict Resolution 
Regional conflict resolution is sometimes about winning wars. More often 
it is about winning the peace. How many more Balkans could the 
Europeans do? Whatever an ideal state of affairs might be in southeastern 
Europe, it seems fair to say that things are a lot better than they were in 
1995. Much was learned in the Balkans that will be of value in any number 
of other global hotspots, whether on the European periphery or further a 
field. Not that the consolidation of peace and prosperity in greater Europe 
is by any means complete.  
 
“Al Qaeda’s Tracks Deepen in Europe,” Washington Post Foreign Service 
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Street Journal Europe, 9 April 2002. 
151 Ibid. 
152  John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt (editors), “Networks and Netwars: The Future of 
Terror, Crime, and Militancy,” op cit.  
153 Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail… , op cit, p. 54. 
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This consolidation remains a core American interest; the Europeans have 
much here to contribute. America will expect Europe to continue 
stabilization efforts in the Balkans, well aware that any kind flare up there 
would severely hamper counter-terrorism efforts elsewhere. Blessed was 
NATO that the attack on New York and Washington did not occur in May 
of 1999, a time at which the Alliance was engaged in a major air war over 
Kosovo). More generally, if the Europeans were to develop additional 
capacity to carry out the kind of post-conflict stabilization seen in the 
Balkans, Washington would clearly welcome it. Numerous regional crises 
call for attention; Afghanistan is only the latest in a long list. Mainstream 
American foreign policy thinking would agree with the following: “We 
welcome an increasingly strong and effective EU…and development of a 
successful European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that is closely 
coordinated with NATO and includes a crisis management and civilian 
policing capability available for international deployment.”
154 
Nation building in Central Asia would be high on the list, making the most 
of close coordination with an ever-more European Russia. Americans have 
a clear interest in the Europeans tending to their ever-larger periphery. The 
European periphery overlaps to a large degree with the “Greater Southwest 
Asia” that has become America’s strategic focus.
155 When it comes to 
pacifying the conflicts between Israel and Palestine and India and Pakistan, 
America is clearly not beyond the need for help. 
Iraq is perhaps the most contentious regional problem, if not nation-
building challenge, now debated across the Atlantic, and “(w)hat to do with 
Saddam Hussein's regime is… likely to remain the most divisive 
transatlantic strategic issue.”
156 The debate is sometimes shrill; 
overreactions and misperceptions abound. Phil Gordon of the Brookings 
Institution would ask the Europeans to do more than wring their hands over 
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America’s ostensible plans for Iraq: “If America's friends and allies want to 
dissuade the United States from unilaterally attacking Iraq, they will have 
to do more than wring their hands and point out all the dangers that would 
be involved. Instead, they will have to take concrete actions to stop or slow 
the pace of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, deter it 
from supporting terrorism, and hasten the day when a new and better 
regime will come to power.”
157 At the same time, it is clear to the White 
House that domestic support for an attack against Iraq will be easier to 
maintain if the European allies are on board.
158 If the ‘coalition’ approach 
used in Afghanistan is any indication, the Bush Administration will be very 
interested in having Europe on board for any invasion of Iraq. For the 
Europeans, this may be a problem, but it is also an opportunity.  
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6. Homeland Defense and Border Affairs 
Interdependence across the Atlantic — “thick globalism”
159 as Joseph Nye 
would put it — makes homeland defense much more than a mere domestic 
or national issue. A myriad of mutual vulnerabilities and the public policy 
dilemmas that come with addressing them (while maintaining an open 
society and relatively open borders) characterize today’s North Atlantic 
world. Europe’s vulnerability is also America’s vulnerability — and vice 
versa. 
Americans want Europe safe — if for no lesser reason than Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which, as of September 12
th, 2001, also applies to 
non-state actors. The aircraft and anthrax attacks of 2001 have focused 
attention on larger and more enduring vulnerabilities that were already a 
problem on September 10
th. The scope of concern is broad. The nature of 
the threat heightens interest in respective domestic arrangements, in more 
active collaboration. Anthony Cordesman provides an example of the 
various vulnerabilities that could be better addressed through greater 
transatlantic cooperation:  
-  Biological attacks 
-  Information warfare and defense 
-  Transportation, hazardous material, high risk facility, and critical 
infrastructure security 
-  Insurance laws and regulations 
-  Immigration and human rights 
-  Arms control agreements and export controls — looking at the CBRN 
and advanced technology threat as a whole
160 
Generally speaking, the United States would prefer that the European 
Union play a significant part in such transatlantic coordination. A 
confusion of national European policies will only undermine transatlantic 
openness. The EU could bring greater efficiency to transatlantic efforts — 
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again, assuming there is trust that the European Union and the United 
States will be pulling in the same direction. A Revolution in Border 
Affairs, at any rate, would have to be transatlantic to deserve such a name. 
7. Reality Check 
A composite of American expectations would not be complete without a 
discussion of Europe as a corrective. Political solidarity thus construed 
would demand balance between validation and legitimacy on the one hand, 
and creative contribution and constructive criticism on the other. For 
Americans who think limited government good government, distrust 
monopolies in all walks of life, and believe democratic principles to be 
universal, Europe provides a valued set of checks and balances. The idea of 
a European counterweight to American excess, if not unilateralism, is 
widespread in U.S. foreign policy circles. “I think we Americans are too 
powerful for our own good as well as for that of the rest of the world… 
Until the members of the European Union become willing to give up 
sovereignty in favor of significance — in reality, not just by proclamation 
— the United States will continue to act unilaterally” proclaims Robert 
Levine.
161 Americans may want a counterweight, but they also know a 
counterweight has to weigh something to tip the scales. A Europe without 
influence will not provide the reality check these Americans want.  
This also means Europe will have to cultivate relations with Washington 
more intensely than Washington does with Europe. The American political 
process is an open one — or so the vast army of lobbyists encamped on the 
Potomac would seem to attest. Europe can play this give-and-take game as 
well — with its own set of roadmaps, strategy inputs, and operational 
capabilities. Americans might in the end support the use of force against 
Saddam Hussein, but they would want to be certain that all other 
alternatives had also been vetted. “If (the Europeans) do not want us to go 
in with guns blazing, they need to get behind a diplomatic strategy — one 
that could well involve Chalabi and the INC — to accomplish our 
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objective.”
162 Europe has to shed the dynamic of not getting attention, 
perceiving no influence, building up resentment, then claiming it wants less 
attention and influence. Autonomy is a state of mind, but not much more. 
Independence in a networked world is largely a function of the way one 
manages one’s own interdependence.  
Europe should hold America true to its principles, but it should not 
abandon America when America cannot be. In a Hobbesian world, 
America will sometimes have to play dirty — or at least tolerate dirty 
bedfellows. There will be a double standard, but there is also a historical 
standard. America’s political principles are ultimately its primary strength 
— and its difference from past great powers. Keeping the tension of this 
double standard in context will be a challenge for Europe. America is what 
it is and the world is as it is; the rules inside the wall are different than 
those outside.
163 Contending with this while remaining a close partner of 
the United States may indeed be one of Europe’s biggest challenges — 
except for the corollary. Outside the wall, Europe, too, must play by a more 
perfidious set of rules.
164 
8. Europe and America in Tomorrow’s World 
The Atlantic civilization that arose out the ashes of Europe’s 20
th century 
wars is going global — not least because of its openness, an openness that 
is also the source of its greatest vulnerability. It is precisely this 
vulnerability to ever-more accessible means of mass destruction and mass 
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disruption that a transformed Atlantic Alliance must address. America 
expects much of Europe — but a new Alliance will also require a new 
America — a requirement to which the old Republic is not entirely 
indisposed. America, too, will again need to nurture the garden of change.  
New policy challenges generate new institutional blueprints. The U.S. 
executive branch will soon have another department; a Secretary of 
Homeland Security — Congress willing — will soon sit at Bush’s cabinet 
table. Some would say the Atlantic institutions are in need of similarly 
dramatic redesign. America must, according to Stanley Sloan, proponent of 
the New Atlantic Initiative, “(r)evitalize the Atlantic community or risk its 
growing irrelevance.” The Atlantic, not just Europe, needs a “wise men’s” 
committee to draft an ”Atlantic Community Treaty” that will put a new 
roof over NATO and US-EU ties. “The treaty should include political, 
economic, and other areas of cooperation that go beyond NATO's mandate. 
The new Atlantic Community Organization would embrace, not replace, 
NATO and US-EU bilateral ties, and provide a new foundation for the 
future of transatlantic relations.”
 165 The opportunity of the moment, if not 
the threat of tomorrow would, it seems, forgive such grand thinking.  
Starting from the assumption that America cannot do everything in today’s 
world, Europe will need to ask itself where it can make the most significant 
contribution to a new construct. Managing the connectivity and 
vulnerability of today’s global dispensation will call for more than winning 
wars. If winning the peace is indeed the challenge of the day, Europe could 
certainly do more. A European World Peace Corps of teachers and 
engineers and bankers and policemen and magistrates — and soldiers — 
might be a place to start. The Europeans also have a colonial legacy — and 
a commensurate obligation.  
 
165 Sloan would go on to suggest NATO set up a spearhead force and a new command: 
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The two powers straddling the Atlantic can do more to make globalization 
sustainable. The Atlantic allies can come up with a bigger, better toolbox. 
The planet’s networks of cooperation, its alliances and mergers and 
acquisitions, can take many forms. Being a little smarter and a little more 
magnanimous about the world to come should not be so hard. The unity in 
diversity of Atlantic civilization is a broad and good foundation upon 
which to build. 
VI. Conclusions  
American counter-terror strategy, like its Atlantic counterpart, will be 
multidimensional and thus also multilateral. Americans want counter-
terrorism that works. The nature of terrorism means that effective counter-
terrorism cannot be a one-country operation. Effective counter-terror 
strategy implies a network-versus-network mode, going global and waging 
war like the New Economy creates value, market researching the world’s 
trouble spots to better root out terrorists while providing the appropriate 
peace and prosperity product.  In this, Europe and America could very 
much benefit from a carefully calibrated set of complementary and 
compatible counter-terror strategies. In facing down the vulnerabilities to 
come, the United States can do more with Europe than without—all the 
rumbling and grumbling about the proper balance of burden and influence, 
about the proper strategy and tactics notwithstanding. 
The roots of America’s multilateralist proclivity are deep and broad, and 
Europe has always played a special role in America’s world. Many other 
regions have vied for pride of place, but the bonds across the Atlantic 
remain the most fundamental. Transatlantic cooperation will be as 
necessary in the next 50 years as it was in the last 50 years — it will 
probably also be as contentious. Putting current disagreements in proper 
historical and geopolitical perspective can help to mitigate them. Burden 
and influence, Europe and the world, carrot and stick, these themes can 
serve as a useful set of reference points by which to assess the 
controversies that continually come up in transatlantic affairs. 
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The process and pursuit of multilateralism finds a different reception in 
American than in Europe. Institutionalized cooperation and dialogue — 
and the political and normative strictures thereby imposed —  cast a 
different shadow across America than across Europe. This is no reason to 
lose heart. American multilateralism comes in many shades, but taken 
together they form an intense impetus to global cooperation. The picture is 
of enthusiasm, but also of caution, caution deeply rooted in the American 
polity and its historical experience. Different perspectives do not rule out 
cooperation. Indeed, there is, despite all the American ambivalence about 
foreign entanglements, many a reason to believe that the United States — 
at least as great powers go — is uniquely conducive to global cooperation. 
Many shades of multilateralism also mean many points where Europeans 
can effectively engage their American interlocutors. Common values and 
common interests will continue to compel cooperation. Disagreements over 
process should not prevent cooperation on substance. The fundamentals 
count and they speak for partnership.  
America has its expectations of what a strong Europe should do. 
Constituted and situated as it is, Europe is clearly in the global game 
whether it wants to be or not. Nor is the hand it holds all that bad. Across a 
wide spectrum of policy areas, the Europeans have the potential to make 
significant contributions to the American, and thus the Atlantic, effort to 
counter-terrorism. Europeans can offer political solidarity and military 
capability; they can share intelligence and carry out effective counter-terror 
law enforcement; they can engage in regional conflict resolution and 
coordinate homeland security and border affairs; finally, the Europeans can 
be a reality check for an American body politic often prone to distraction 
but nevertheless showing a new sense of urgency about the world in which 
it lives.  
Americans want a global order where the vulnerabilities to mass 
destruction are minimized, where the open society is defended. All the 
same, no power has infinite stamina and focus. Like a marathon runner, 
America’s war on terrorism will sometimes hit ‘the wall,’ foundering on 
indecision, if not division. A sometimes self-absorbed America will be 
preoccupied, as the New Economy retrenches, and fall 2002 elections leave 
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politics more local. Europeans could thus do well to promote American 
engagement and focus. Europeans, it would seem, tend to suffer more when 
America is disengaged than when it is engaged (e.g., the Balkans from 
1991 to 1995). Europeans serving sometimes as a reality check also means 
Europeans sometimes serving as a force of continuity: a fly-wheel with a 
predilection for predictability and all the institutional machinery this 
implies. Counter-terror strategy has to be selective and smart; economies 
need to be maximized. Still, American and Atlantic ad hocery will impose 
its costs. Jean Monnet, that great European, that great Atlanticist, was not 
completely wrong in saying “Nothing is possible without men: nothing is 
lasting without institutions.”
166 Europe, then, should take America at its 
word and hold America to its word. Europe should build on the good things 
and not dwell on the bad. Finally, Europe should promote the partnership 
even more than the Americans promote it. America will be a better 
America as well as a better partner for it. 
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